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a b s t r a c t
The issue of selfish routing through a network has received a lot of attention in recent years. We study
an atomic dynamic routing scenario, where players allocate resources with load dependent costs only for
some limited time.
Our paper introduces a natural discrete version of the deterministic queuing model introduced by
Koch and Skutella (2011). In this model the time a user needs to traverse an edge e is given by a constant
travel time and the waiting time in a queue at the end of e. At each discrete time step the first ue users
of the queue proceed to the end vertex of e, where ue denotes the capacity of the edge e. An important
aspect of this model is that it ensures the FIFO property.
We study the complexity of central algorithmic questions for this model such as determining an
optimal flow in an empty network, an optimal path in a congested network or a maximum dynamic flow
and the question whether a given flow is a Nash equilibrium.
For the bottleneck case, where the cost of each user is the travel time of the slowest edge on her path,
the main results here are mostly bad news. Computing social optima and Nash equilibria turns out to be
NP-complete and the Price of Anarchy is given by the number of users.
We also consider themakespan objective (arrival time of the last user) and show that optimal solutions
and Nash equilibria in these games, where every user selfishly tries to minimize her travel time, can be
found efficiently.
© 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd.
This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).1. Introduction
Routing by independent users in a network can be viewed as
a non-cooperative game, where selfish players choose their routes
through the network (see e.g. [1,2]). From the game-theoretic point
of view one can expect the routes chosen by the users to form a
Nash equilibrium [3] or a strong equilibrium [4], which, in general,
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0/).does not constitute an overall optimal solution (see [5]). The high-
est ratio of the social objective of a (strong) Nash equilibrium to
the optimal objective is called (strong) Price of Anarchy and gives
a measure for the maximum lack of performance that arises due to
selfish behaviour (see [6–8]).
The issue of selfish routing has received a lot of attention in
the recent years, from both the theory as well as the networking
communities. Most of the work in the literature has been on static
routing, where a user induces load on all edges of her path simul-
taneously. Recently dynamic models have gained more attention
(see [9,10]). Here, each user travels through the network, and at
any point in time she only adds load to the edge she is currently
using.
We consider a natural discrete version of the deterministic
queuing model introduced by Koch and Skutella [11]. Here, each
le under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.
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ber of users who can leave an edge per time unit, while the others
have to wait until the next point in time. The users leave the edge
in the same order as they entered it (FIFO property). In the case that
multiple users enter the edge at the same time different tie break-
ing rules are discussed. The goal is to find a flow with minimum
travel time. In a game-theoretic context of a dynamic congestion
game, each user chooses a path s.t. her personal travel time is min-
imized.
Most of our work is on bottleneck problems where the cost of a
user is the most expensive resource on her path. There are several
applications which motivate this model in the dynamic setting
(for more applications of bottleneck games we refer to Banner and
Orda [12]).
In the transport of living cargo (livestock) within the European
Union there are numerous regulations regarding travel times and
resting periods, see [13]. In particular, there are upper limits for the
travel times between two stops. At every stop, livestock need to be
fed/watered and inspected. In this setting, the links of the network
do not correspond to physical roads but rather to aggregated travel
routes between two replenishing points, so that a feeding/watering
stop is mandatory after the traversal of every arc. The total time
spent on a link, i.e., the constant travel time plus the time in the
waiting queue, reflects the (aggregated) travel time, where the
waiting time in a queue is due to congestion, e.g. at loading docks.
Different types of vehicles have different effects on the congestion.
Since for instance in extreme weather livestock suffer during
transport and waiting, the bottleneck value on a path through the
network can be viewed as an indicator of the risk for the animals.
Due to the mandatory stops after every link, in fact the maximum
travel time of a link is more appropriate here than the total travel
time. Even though the links correspond to aggregated routes, still
typical rules of traffic networks such as regulations about the right
of way apply (e.g. major roads/minor roads, left-before-right-rule).
Thismotivates the study of local tie-breaking ruleswhenusers enter
a link simultaneously.
A second application occurs in routing in all-optical networks.
Whenever more than one data packet arrives at a network node
at the same time and multiple packets are destined for the same
output, blocking occurs. In general, packets are processed in a
first-in-first-out (FIFO) matter at every node, but there is also
local priority ordering of the input ports associated with the node.
Instead of dropping all but one packet, the current state-of-the-art
technology uses fibre delay lines (FDLs) to delay the light, where
packets circle until they can be forwarded, see e.g. [14–16]. For
more information about all-optical networks we refer to standard
textbooks such as [17]. There is a natural correspondence to
waiting in an FDL and users spending time in the waiting queue
in our model. The optical information deteriorates both on the
links and in the fibre delay lines, but can be regenerated when the
packet is finally forwarded. Since optical regeneration components
are expensive (and somewhat slow), the FDLs are typically not
equipped with this technology. The overall goal of a ‘‘good’’
routing is to minimize themaximum time between two nodes, the
bottleneck value.
A related application occurs in (not necessarily all-optical)
communication networks. Asmentioned in [12], due to limited size
of transmission buffers, there is an interest for the users who are
sending data through the network to minimize the utilization of
the most utilized buffer in order to avoid deadlocks and reduce
packet loss. While Banner and Orda [12] considered the situation
that a user permanently uses capacity on her chosen path, we
consider a dynamic settingwhere this capacity is released once the
data has left the link.
In a game-theoretic context, each message is sent by a selfish
user who attempts to minimize the bottleneck value only on herpath. If information from different edges enter a single node and
a single edge with low capacity afterwards tie-breaking rules are
needed to decide which user’s information is processed first. In
the networks considered here, the purifier acts on the information
from one channel after the other and the order of the messages in
one channel remains as it was before.
For other applications of (static) bottleneck games we refer
to [12].
1.1. Related work
A deterministic queuing model in the non-atomic case was
investigated by Koch and Skutella [11]. Here, each edge has a
constant travel time and a capacitywhich states the amount of flow
that can leave an edge per time unit. They show that Nash flows
in dynamic congestion games can be computed as special static
flows and give results about the Price of Anarchy. Anshelevich and
Ukkusuri [18] investigate another non-atomic dynamic routing
model, where each edge has a flow dependent latency function.
They show that in the single-commodity case there is always a
Nash equilibrium which can be computed efficiently.
Atomic models with flow dependent latency functions have
been investigated by Farzad et al. [19] and Hoefer et al. [20]. In
the first paper different models for the priorities of the users are
discussed and the Price of Anarchy for (weighted) atomic models
is computed. The second paper deals with the realistic effect
that users delay other users after them. Therefore they introduce
different local scheduling policies on the edges and show that the
existence and computability of equilibria depends on the policy.
For example, they show that the existence of equilibria is not
guaranteed for every policy. Even for those,where the computation
can always be done in polynomial time, a best-response step may
be NP-hard to compute.
Work stated above deals with sum objective of the users. We
mainly consider the bottleneck objective (see e.g., [12]). In the
static case (even weighted) bottleneck games always have an
optimal strong equilibrium, since a potential can be constructed
from the bottleneck values of the players (see e.g. [21,22]).
Furthermore, a Nash equilibrium can be computed in polynomial
time in many cases. This can be done with a transformation to a
minimum cost flow computation w.r.t. effective costs (see [23]) or
by reducing the capacity on the resourceswith the help of an oracle
(e.g., for network games it computes a maximum flow, see [24]).
On the other hand, computing an optimal Nash equilibrium is
NP-complete in multi-commodity networks (see [12]) or for
weighted games (see [25]). The (strong) Price of Anarchy in these
games has been investigated by many authors, e.g. by Banner and
Orda [12]; Correa et al. [26]; Busch and Magdon-Ismail [27]; and
Werth et al. [28]. In [12] it is shown that for linear latency functions
the value is bounded from above by the number of edges and
that this bound is tight, while for non-linear functions the value
is unbounded. In [26] the fairness, i.e., the ratio of the best and
the worst objective of a user, is computed, both for congestion and
bottleneck games. Busch and Magdon-Ismail [27] showed that the
Price of Anarchy is given by the length of a longest path in the
network and in [28] it is shown that the strong Price of Anarchy
in the unweighted case is given by 2.
1.2. Our contribution
We discuss an atomic, dynamic routing scenario in the deter-
ministic queuing model for sum and bottleneck objectives. For the
bottleneck objective we show that deciding whether a flow or
path with a desired bottleneck value exists is NP-hard for many
classes of instances (even for a single-commodity network with
unweighted users). Furthermore, there are instances without a
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Overview on most complexity results in this paper. The first column states the problem, the second and third the assumptions for the positive (polynomial time solvability)
and negative (NP-hardness) results in the sum case and the fourth column the assumptions for the negative results in the bottleneck case.
Sum Bottleneck
Polynomially solv. NP-hard NP-hard
Path – – Acyclic graph
(Section 4)
Flow Single-commodity, general graph
(Section 6.1)
Two-commodity, acyclic graph
(Appendix B.2)
Two-commodity, acyclic graph
(Section 3)
Nash test Two-commodity, acyclic graph
(as bottleneck case)
Two-commodity, acyclic graph
(Section 5.1)
Nash existence Single-commodity, general graph
(see Quickest Flow)
Multi-commodity, acyclic graph
(Appendix B.3)
Multi-commodity, acyclic graph
(Section 5.2)Nash equilibriumand the questionwhether a given strategy profile
is a Nash equilibrium or the questionwhether there is a Nash equi-
librium for a given instance are both NP-hard. Furthermore, we
give tight bounds on the (strong) Price of Anarchy for games with
bottleneck objective. Specifically, we show that the (strong) Price
of Anarchy and the Price of Anarchy are both equal to the num-
ber of users. This holds for unweighted and also weighted games,
single commodities and acyclic graphs.
We also discuss the sum objective in a single-commodity net-
work with unweighted users. Here, the computation of a maxi-
mum flow for a given time horizon and, hence the computation
of a flow with minimum travel time can be done in polynomial
time. Furthermore, a Nash equilibrium can also be computed ef-
ficiently, even in the weighted case under additional constraints
(see Table 1).
Our paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we formally
introduce the deterministic queuing model and show that there
are instances without a Nash equilibrium. Sections 3–5 consider
the bottleneck case. Section 3 addresses the complexity of socially
optimal flowswith bottleneck objective. In Section 4we prove that
computing a narrowest path, i.e., a path with minimum bottleneck
value in a network where there are already some units of flow
routed on given paths, is NP-hard. The construction is used in the
subsequent Section 5 to derive results about the hardness of testing
a given strategy profile for being a Nash equilibrium. This section
also contains a hardness result for the question whether a Nash
equilibrium exists for a given instance and our tight bounds on the
price of anarchy in dynamic games with bottleneck objective.
In Sections 6 and 7 we investigate the case where the personal
cost of each user is the total length of her path. The main result
of Section 6 is that a socially optimal flow with respect to the
makespan objective can be computed in polynomial time. The
efficient computation of equilibria in these games is addressed in
Section 7.
2. Deterministic queuing model
The underlyingmodel is similar to the static atomic routing sce-
nario. An instance in the most general form is given by Γ = [G =
(V , E), (τe, ue)e∈E,

wj

j=1,...,k , (sj, tj)j=1,...,k].
Here, E is the set of m edges of a directed graph G = (V , E), V
is the set of n vertices, k is the number of unsplittable weighted
users, wj is the weight of user j ∈ {1, . . . , k} , τe is the constant
free travel time and ue is the capacity of edge e ∈ E. If wj = 1 for
all users j, only the number of users k is stated and the instance is
called unweighted in that case. If sj = s and tj = t for all j, it is called
a single-commodity instance.
We call a path P from sj to tj feasible for user j if it is simple and
ue ≥ wj for all e ∈ P , i.e., the capacity of each edge on the path is
at least the weight of the user. ByPj we denote the feasible paths
for player j (also called her strategies) and byP = kj=1Pj their
union.
A strategy profile (Pj)j=1,...,k specifies for every user j one feasible
path Pj ∈ Pj the user allocates her weight to. We also call such astrategy profile a (dynamic) flow and write f = fPjj=1,...,k with
fPj = wj. While it may seem that specifying a flow by explicitly
giving the path for each of the k users unnecessarily increases
the input size, there are examples showing that this is inevitable
in the dynamic model: different path decompositions of a flow
specified only on the edges of the network may yield equilibria or
not, depending on the particular decomposition.
In this paper we introduce an atomic variant of the determinis-
tic queuing model by Koch and Skutella [11]: a user j ∈ U who is
in a vertex u at time t enters the next edge e = (v,w) in her path
immediately. After the free travel time τe she arrives at the end of
the edge and is added to a waiting queue Qe. This is a sorted list of
the weights of the users who arrive at the end of edge e up to time
t+τe, but do not leave the edge to the next vertex before time t+τe.
They are stored in the queue Qe in the same order as they entered
it, i.e., if user i entered edge e before user j, then the entry for user
i is ranked higher in the list Qe than the entry of user j. In the case
of simultaneous arrival we introduce priorities to break the tie (see
the paragraph after the travel times).
Every step in time users with a total weight up to the capacity
ue of the edge e leave the edge to its end vertex w in the same or-
der as they have been placed in the queue Qe before. Let the entries
(weights of the players) at time t+τe be given byQe = (q1, . . . , qp)
and α1 ≤ p maximum with α1i=1 qi ≤ ue. Then the user cor-
responding to the first α1 entries from Qe leaves the queue, and
hence, also the edge, at time t + τe without further waiting. By
removing their entries from the list Qe and repeating the compu-
tation, the time the other users leave the edge can be computed
as well. Let αl ≤ p be maximum with αli=αl−1+1 qi ≤ ue for
l ≥ 2. Note that we set α0 = 0 here. The computation stops when
all users from the queue have been considered with an index
r with αr = p. Let user j correspond to an entry in the set
{αl−1 + 1, . . . , αl} for some l ∈ {1, . . . , p}. Then, she leaves edge
e at time t + τe + l − 1. The waiting time of user j on edge e in
the flow f is denoted by qe,j(f ). Since she entered edge e at time t
and the waiting queue at time t + τe, her waiting time is given by
qe,j(f ) = l− 1. In the unweighted case the situation is even easier.
Since each weight is equal to 1, the αl are given by integer multi-
ples of the capacity ue, i.e., αl = l ue. Then the waiting time of user
j is given by qe,j(f ) =

πj−1
ue

.
The latency (or travel time) of user j on edge e is defined as the
free travel time plus the waiting time, i.e., it is given by ℓe,j(f ) =
τe + qe,j(f ).
We assume that the free travel times τe are integral. This as-
sumption is needed for gameswith bottleneck objective, since oth-
erwise equilibria may not exist even in simple extension-parallel
graphs. Furthermore, waiting in the vertices is not allowed in this
model as discussed in the Introduction.
While in the non-atomic case the above conditions are enough
to characterize the model (see [11]), the situation in the atomic
case is more involved. If two users arrive at an edge at the same
time it is not a priori clear in which order they enter the edge. This
is in particular important if the capacity of the edge is smaller than
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this issue we discuss two tie-breaking rules in this paper. In case of
a tie, the user with better priority is placed on a higher position in
thewaiting queue.Note that better priority alwaysmeans a smaller
number for the priority.
The first rule assigns a global priority π ′j (e) = j to each user
j ∈ {1, . . . , k} on every edge e ∈ Pj. In case of simultaneous arrival
the user with better priority is always processed first. This rule is
the natural choice used for congestion games (see the literature,
e.g., [19]).
The other rule assigns a priority to each edge entering a vertex
and, in the case of simultaneous arrival, the users from the edge
with better priority are processed before the other users. The
ordering between the users on the same edge is carried over from
the previous edge they traversed, and, at a source vertex, which
lacks ingoing edges, the users receive a starting priority. More
precisely, for all edges e entering a vertex vwe have a local priority
π ′(e). Additionally, we introduce a starting priority π ′j = j to all
users j ∈ U for the source vertex.With these two values the current
priority π ′j (e) for user j on edge e ∈ Pj can be computed. Consider
two users i and j who enter an edge e at the same time. Then the
current priority π ′i (e) of user i is better than the current priority
π ′j (e) of user j iff one of the following cases holds true:
(1) both users enter edge e after leaving different edges ei and ej,
and the priority of the edge ei of user i is better than the priority
of the edge ej of user j, i.e., π ′(ei) < π ′(ej).
(2) bothusers enter edge e from the sameedge e′ anduser i entered
that edge before user j or, if they entered the edge e′ at the
same time, the priority of user i on that edge is better than the
priority of user j, i.e., π ′i (e′) < π
′
j (e
′).
(3) both users enter edge e from the source vertex s, and the
starting priority of user i is better than the starting priority of
user j, i.e., π ′i < π
′
j .
We discuss two objectives in this paper. In a game with sum
objective (as in congestion games) the personal cost user j wants
to minimize is her total travel time Tj(f ) = e∈Pj ℓe,j(f ), i.e., the
sum of the latency values of all edges in her path Pj. As a social
objective we consider themakespan of the strategy profile, T (f ) =
maxj=1,...,k Tj(f ), i.e., the highest travel time of all users.We refer to
these games as dynamic routing games with sum objective in the
deterministic queuing model and write in short as only game with
sum objective.
In a game with bottleneck objective (as in bottleneck games)
the personal cost user j wants to minimize is her bottleneck value
bj(f ) = max

ℓe,j(f ) | e ∈ Pj

, i.e., the highest latency value of
all edges in her path Pj, while we choose the social objective to
be the bottleneck of the game defined as b(f ) = maxj=1,...,k bj(f ),
i.e., the highest bottleneck value of all users. We refer to these
games as dynamic routing games with bottleneck objective in the
deterministic queuing model and write in short as only game with
bottleneck objective.
If not stated otherwise, in games with sum objective the global
tie-breaking rule is applied, which assigns priorities to the users.
In games with bottleneck objective the local tie-breaking rule is
applied, which assigns additional priorities to the edges. Most
results for games with bottleneck objective hold true for the global
tie-breaking rule, too. This is discussed in more detail later on.
We discuss two solution concepts in this paper, optimum
solutions and equilibria. A strategy profile with minimal social
objective is called an optimal strategy profile and the optimal
objective value is denoted by opt(Γ ).
A coalition of users C ⊆ {1, . . . , k} is satisfied with their
strategies, if not all of them can improve their personal objective
values by changing their strategies simultaneously.When all single
users, i.e., coalitions of size 1, are satisfied with their strategies,Fig. 1. Illustration of the model. Left: instance consisting of four weighted users.
The weight is the boxed number and the index states the starting priority. The
first number near an edge is the travel time and the second one the capacity. The
expressions near the vertex v give the priority of the ingoing edge, where (a) is a
better priority than (b). Right: the first picture (above left) shows the paths of the
four users, the other pictures their positions in the network at different times t .
the strategy profile is called a Nash equilibrium (NE). If even all
coalitions of users are satisfied with their strategies, then the
strategy profile is called a strong equilibrium (SE).
First we illustrate the deterministic queuing model with an
example of a routing game with bottleneck objective.
Example 1. Consider the graph G = (V , E) from Fig. 1 with k =
4 weighted users and the travel times and capacities as given
near the edges in the picture. As for all games with bottleneck
objective in this paper we use the local definition of the priorities
for the users as defined above. To that end, the starting priorities
of the users are given by the small indices to the weights of the
users and the priorities of ingoing edges to vertex v are indicated
with small letters (where (a) denotes the better priority than (b)).
Note that the same instance without the priorities for the edges
also defines an instance of a gamewith sumobjective in our setting.
Users 1 and 2 with weight 2 travel along the lower path and
users 3 and 4 with weight 1 along the upper path. At time 1 the
users from the upper edge arrive at the end of the first edge. Since
the capacity of that edge is 1, only one of the users is allowed
to leave the edge to the vertex v. This is user 3, since she has a
higher starting priority than user 4, who has to wait for the next
point in time. More formally, the set of users in the waiting queue
Q = (13, 14) are separated in subsets of weight up to 1, i.e., in
the two lists Q1 = (13) and Q2 = (14), where the users from the
first one are allowed to leave the edge. The other two users are still
travelling along the lower edge.
At time 2 user 3 already arrives at the terminal t and user 4
leaves her edge towards vertex v. Users 1 and 2 arrive at the end
of the lower edge and line up in the queue. Here, user 1 is placed
before user 2, since she had a higher priority at the source vertex.
Then, both users leave the edge towards vertex v, since the capacity
of the edge is large enough for both users. So, users 1, 2 and 4 enter
the last edge at the same time and traverse it with travel time 1.
At time 3 the users arrive at the end of the edge and line up
in the waiting queue. Since the lower edge has a better priority
than the upper edge entering vertex v, the users from the lower
edge are placed before user 4 in the queue. Furthermore, user 1 is
placed before user 2, since they entered from the same edge and
user 1 was placed before user 2 on the previous edge. Since the
capacity of the edge is 3 and overtaking is not allowed, the queue
Q = (21, 22, 14) is separated into Q1 = (21) and Q2 = (22, 14). So,
user 1 arrives at the terminal at time 3 and users 2 and 4 have to
wait until time 4.
Note that the same instance can also be investigated for a game
with sum objective. Here, we always use another tie-breaking rule
with global priorities for the users and ignore the priorities given
at the end of the edges. For the priorities chosen in this example
the resulting flow is exactly the same. But, if users 3 and 4 had the
best starting priorities, then the last one of these two would enter
the terminal before the two heavier users. ▹
In the next example we show that, in contrast to static games,
the existence of aNash equilibrium in adynamic routing gamewith
bottleneck objective is not ensured.
22 T.L. Werth et al. / Operations Research Perspectives 1 (2014) 18–41Fig. 2. No Nash equilibrium in an instance with unit capacities and a multi-commodity acyclic graph (on the left). Four relevant strategy profiles of the four users on the
right. Here, dashed (blue) lines are used for the first commodity, dotted (green) lines for the second commodity and solid (red) lines for the other two; unused edges are
omitted on the right. The numbers on some edges show the bottleneck values of the corresponding users from commodities 1 and 2 that cause them to be unsatisfied with
their strategy. The small letters indicate the priorities of the ingoing edges for a vertex. The filled vertices show situations where users enter an edge at the same time. (For
interpretation of the references to colour in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)Fig. 3. Illustration of the model. The numbers near the edges state the travel times on the edges, the numbers near the vertices state the times the corresponding (main)
user enters that vertex. Left: instance for local tie-breaking rules induced by the priorities of the edges. Here, the small letter states the priorities of the ingoing edges. Right:
instance for global tie-breaking rules induced by the priorities of the users. Here is an additional auxiliary user on her s′–t ′-path.Example 2. Consider the graph G = (V , E) from Fig. 2with k = 4
unweighted users and the travel times as given in the picture near
the edges, where A ≥ 4 as an instance of a game with bottleneck
objective. All capacities are set to one and the priorities of ingoing
edges are indicated with small letters. Commodities are denoted
by (si, ti) for user i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}with priority i.
Note that users from commodities 3 and 4 do not have a choice
on which route to take. Their purpose is slowing of the other users.
So they are called blocking users. The users from commodities 1
and 2 have two choices each, because the outer paths have a
bottleneck value of A+1,which is not acceptable aswe see later on.
Then there are four strategy profiles left that are drawn as graphs
in the right of Fig. 2.
Whenever both (normal) users choose their left paths (upper
left strategy profile), then the lower user arrives at her second
vertex (filled) at the same time as the left blocking user. Since the
path of the blocking users has an inferior priority, the blocking
user is slowed down by one time unit. This is enough to reach
the third vertex of the upper user at the same time as the user
from commodity 1 does. Since the blocking users edge has a higher
priority, the upper user has to wait one time unit, which results
in a bottleneck value of A + 1 on that edge. Hence, she changes
to the right path (upper right strategy profile). Here, the blocking
user arrives after her at the third vertex and hence she arrives at
vertex vwith bottleneck value A. At this point her edge has a higher
priority than the edge of the lower user who arrives at the same
time. Hence, the lower user has to wait and gets a bottleneck value
of A + 1. So, also the lower user changes her strategy to the rightone (lower right strategy profile), which results in the same case
as when both users took the left paths. Hence, there is no Nash
equilibrium for this instance. ▹
The above example also shows that even for an instance with a
single commodity a best-response dynamics may follow the cycle,
and hence it is not guaranteed to find a Nash equilibrium in every
case: if one adds a super source and a super terminal to the sources
and sinks of the example respectively and one starts with the
initial configuration of users as in one of the figures from 2, a
best-response dynamics may follow the cycle and, hence, does not
terminate.
A crucial point in the last example was the fact that one user
could delay another user and be delayed herself by that user later
on. This situation was caused by the fact that one time the priority
of the edge from which the first user entered a vertex had higher
priority than the edge from which the second user entered the
same vertex and for another vertex the situationwas the otherway
round. So, the question arises whether for global priorities of the
users of such a situation can be avoided.
In the next example we illustrate that also for the tie-breaking
rule with global priorities the same situation can occur. This can
happen in the multi-commodity case or if a subset of the users
routes on somehow fixed paths, since we need additional users to
delay some of the main users.
Example 3. Consider the graphs fromFig. 3with unweightedusers
and the travel times as given near the edges in the picture as an
instance for a routing game. All capacities are set to 1. For the left
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edges and for the right instance the global tie-breaking rule with
global priorities for the users. For both instanceswe have twomain
users, and for the right one we have an additional auxiliary user.
In the left picture bothmain users arrive at vertex u at the same
time 2. Since user 2 enters the vertex from an edge with better
priority, she is placed before user 1 on the upcoming edge and
hence also enters vertex v before user 1, since all capacities are
set to 1. Then user 2 chooses the longer edge towards vertex w.
Therefore, both users arrive at the end of vertex (w, t) at the same
time. Since user 1 enters vertexw from an edgewith better priority
here, she is placed before user 2 on the upcoming edge and hence
also enters the terminal t before user 2. In total, each user delays
the other user once.
In the right picture there is an additional auxiliary user. Main
user 2 arrives at vertex u at the same time (1) as the auxiliary user.
Since she has the better priority, she is placed before the auxiliary
user on the upcoming edge and hence also enters vertex v before
the auxiliary user, who has to wait in the waiting queue until the
next point in time. At time 2 main user 1 also enters the queue,
but since she entered later than the auxiliary user she is placed
in the queue after her (although she has a better priority). So, she
arrives at vertex v at time 4. Afterwards, as in the left instance, both
main users arrive at vertex w at the same time. Since main user 1
has a better priority than main user 2 in such a case, she is placed
before main user 2 on the upcoming edge and hence also enters
the terminal t before main user 2. In total, each of the main users
delays the other main user once. ▹
Applying the same technique of adding additional users to the
instance from Example 2 shows that the existence of a Nash equi-
librium in a dynamic routing gamewith bottleneck objective is also
not ensured for global priorities.
3. The Narrowest Flow problem
In this section we show that finding a flow with minimum
bottleneck value, i.e., a social optimum in a game with bottleneck
objective, is hard in general. This is shown for different scenarios:
in the multi-commodity case, even if the graph is acyclic and the
users are unweighted, in a general graph, even if it has only a single
commodity and the users are unweighted and for weighted users,
even on a graph consisting of parallel links.
Definition 1 (NarrowestFlow Problem).
Input: Instance
Γ = [G = (V , E), (τe, ue)e∈E, k, (sj, tj)j=1,...,k]
and a bound b.
Question: Is there a feasible flow f = fPjj=1,...,k for that
instance with bottleneck value smaller or equal
to b?
Theorem 1. NarrowestFlow is NP-complete in the strong sense in
the two-commodity case, even if the graph is acyclic.
Proof. The proof uses a reduction from the 3-SAT problem as
in [29]. Recall that an instance of 3-SAT is given by a set of Boolean
variables X = x0, . . . , xη−1, and ρ clauses (Cj)j=1,...,ρ containing
exactly three literals (variables or their negations). The question is
whether there is a truth assignment T : X → {0, 1} s.t. any clause
Cj contains at least one literal which is true. In the sequel we de-
note by ℓi ∈ {xi, x¯i} a literal involving the variable xi, andwe extend
an arbitrary truth assignment T : X → {0, 1} in the standardway to
the negated literals by setting T (x¯i) := 0 if T (xi) = 1 and T (x¯i) := 1
if T (xi) = 0.
Wenowconstruct an instance ofNarrowestFlow in such away
that there is a flow with bottleneck value equal to 1 iff there is a
Yes-answer for 3-SAT.For each literal vertex xi there is a gadget as illustrated in the
left part of Fig. 4 containing of a source vertex vis and a terminal
vertex vit , which are connected by two disjoint paths (v
i
s, v
i
1, v
i
2,
. . . , vi2pi , v
i
t) and (v
i
s, v
i
1, v
i
2, . . . , v
i
2pi , v
i
t). Here, pi is the number
of occurrences of the variable xi in the clauses and qi is the number
of occurrences of the negated variable xi in the clauses. We denote
by θ = max {pi, qi} and set T = ηθ + 1. The travel time from vi2pi
to vit is given by θ − 2pi − 1 and the travel time from vi2qi to vit is
given by θ − 2qi − 1. All other travel times in these two paths and
all capacities are set to 1.
Furthermore, there are two commodities: (s1, t1)with one user
and (s2, t2) with ρ users. Their actual priorities are not important
for this proof. The first source vertex s1 is connected via an edge
with travel time 1 to vertex v0s in the first gadget (the one of vari-
able x0). The gadget of variable xi is connected to the gadget of vari-
able xi+1 for all i ∈ {0, . . . , η − 2}. This is done with an edge from
vertex vit in gadget i to vertex v
i+1
s in gadget i+1with travel time 1.
The last gadget is connected to the terminal with an edge from ver-
tex vη−1t to the terminal vertex t1. In total we have k = 1 + ρ un-
weighted users.
For each clause Cj there is a clause vertex Cj. From each of these
vertices there is an edge to the second terminal vertex t2. The sec-
ond source vertex s2 is connected to vertex vi2l−1 for l ∈ {1, . . . , pi}
in gadget i ∈ {0, . . . , η − 1}with an edgewith travel time iθ+l+1.
The vertex vi2l for l ∈ {1, . . . , pi} in each gadget i ∈ {0, . . . , η − 1}
is connected to the lth clause vertex that contains the literal xi via
an edge with travel time T − iθ − l− 3.
The actual priorities of the edges are also not important for the
reduction, so they are chosen arbitrarily. Note that for the current
proof we need to replace all edges with travel time greater than 1
by a path of consecutive edges with travel times equal to 1 and
the same total length. It is not stated that way directly, since we
will reuse the construction later on without this restriction for the
makespan objective. The whole reduction is illustrated in the bot-
tom part of Fig. 4.
Note that the first user arrives at vertex vil at time iθ+l+1, if she
is not slowed downby one of the other users before. Furthermore, a
user from the second commodity traversing vertex vil arrives there
at the same time. Hence, if both users traverse the same vertex,
one of them is slowed down by one time unit. In the absence of
the users from the second commodity, the first user arrives at her
terminal vertex t1 at time ηθ + 1 = T . In the absence of the
other users, a single user from the second commodity traversing a
shortest path arrives at the clause vertex she traverses at time iθ+
l+1+1+T−iθ−l−3 = T−1 and at her terminal vertex t2 at time T .
In a flow with bottleneck value ≤1, the edges connecting the
gadgets can only be used by the first user. Hence, any user from
the second commodity can only traverse a single gadget. Since ev-
ery clause is connected to the second terminal vertex t2 by a single
edge and a total amount of ρ users have to be routed for the second
commodity, a flow with bottleneck value ≤1 has to route a single
unit of flow along each clause vertex. Furthermore, no user in this
flow can be slowed down by another user, since every path has ca-
pacity 1, free travel time T and all users traversing a subpath of the
path arrive at the common vertices at the same time.
With these observations it is easy to show that there is a flow
with bottleneck value equal to 1 iff there is a feasible truth assign-
ment.
Let f be a feasible flow with bottleneck value 1. Then, a single
unit of flow routes from s1 to t1 without meeting another user. We
set the variable xi to true if this unit routes in the ith gadget along
the lower path and we set the variable xj to false if it routes in the
jth gadget along the upper path. Then the users from the second
commodity route along the vertices from the upper path in gadget
i and along vertices from the lower path in gadget j. From these
24 T.L. Werth et al. / Operations Research Perspectives 1 (2014) 18–41Fig. 4. Illustration of the reduction from 3-SAT to the Narrowest Flow problem in the two-commodity case. Top: the graph shows a gadget representing a literal
xi, i ∈ {0, . . . , η − 1}. The expressions near some of the edges are the travel times of these edges. The expressions near some of the vertices denote the expected arrival
times at these vertices, if there is a feasible truth assignment. All capacities are set to 1, edge priorities are omitted. Bottom: shows the whole graph. The greyly shaded areas
illustrate the gadgets.Fig. 5. Illustration of the reduction from LongestPath in a graph G to dynamic NarrowestFlow in the drawn graph.vertices one unit of flow is routed to each of the clause vertices
and afterwards to the sink. Since at least one vertex in the path of
a gadget of the corresponding variable is connected to a clause it is
contained in any clause there is one vertex that is set to true by the
flow. So, the flow induces a truth assignment.
On the other hand, given a truth assignment, we route the user
from the first commodity in the ith gadget along the lower path if
the variable xi in the truth assignment is true andwe route the user
in the jth gadget along the upper path if the variable xj is false. At
least one vertex in the path of a gadget of the corresponding vari-
able is connected to a clause it is contained in. Additionally, in any
clause there is one variable that is set to true. Hence, for the second
commodity we route one unit of flow towards each clause vertex
to which no unit of flow from the second commodity was already
routed to. It is sent on a shortest path along a vertex in the upper
path of gadget i or in the lower path of gadget j (depending on the
choice for the first commodity). This gives a feasible flow and no
two units of flow use the same edge. Hence, the bottleneck value
of this flow is given by 1. The above construction handles the multi-commodity case.
Now we show that the problem remains NP-complete in the
single-commodity case ifwe allowgeneral graphswithout restrict-
ing the problem to acyclic graphs.
Theorem 2. NarrowestFlow is NP-complete in the strong sense in
general graphs with unweighted users, even if there is only a single
commodity.
Proof. We provide a polynomial-time reduction from Longest-
Path. Given an instance of LongestPath, i.e., a graph G = (V , E)
with |E| = m, source–sink pair (sG, tG), latencies ℓe = 1 for all
e ∈ E and a constant K ≤ m, the question is whether there
is a simple path of length exactly K . It is shown by Garey and
Johnson [30] that LongestPath (in this variant) is NP-complete in
the strong sense.
For the instance of NarrowestFlowwe construct a graph G′ as
shown in Fig. 5 and take k = m+1 users. There arem paths Pi from
s to v with i ∈ {2, . . . ,m+ 2} \ {K + 2} edges in a row. All travel
times and capacities are set to 1.
T.L. Werth et al. / Operations Research Perspectives 1 (2014) 18–41 25Fig. 6. Top: illustration of the reduction from 3-SAT to NarrowestPath. The clauses are C1 = (x1 ∨ x2 ∨ x3), C2 = (x¯1 ∨ x¯2 ∨ x3) and C3 = (x1 ∨ x¯2 ∨ x¯3) over the variables
{x1, x2, x3}. The free travel times ≠ 1 are written near the edges, the priorities of ingoing edges are small letters. Below: a feasible truth assignment (left: x2 = x3 = x1 = 1)
and an infeasible one (right: x2 = x1 = x1 = 1) illustrated by solid (red) paths. The dotted (green) path shows where the bottleneck is increased to 2 for the infeasible
assignment. (For interpretation of the references to colour in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)We show that there is a flowwith bottleneck value 1 in G′ ⇐⇒
there is a simple path with length exactly K in G.
⇐H: We send one user along the path that consists of edge
(s, sG), the simple path of length K in G and the part (tg , v, t). The
other m users are sent along the m disjoint upper paths and the
edge (v, t). Since all of these m paths arrive at v at different times
between 2 andm+2, but none at time K +2, there is no edge with
load>1 and hence, no user receives a bottleneck value higher than
1.
H⇒: Given a flow with bottleneck value 1, there has to be
exactly one user to traverse graph G. Furthermore, there cannot be
two users on edge (v, t) at the same time. Hence, the user going
through graph G has to arrive at vertex v at time K + 2. So, she has
to take a simple path of length exactly K in G. 
As in other dynamic models, the first non-trivial class of graphs
are those consisting of parallel links and an additional edge
afterwards with unit free travel times and capacities. One can
show that an optimal solution there can be stated explicitly. Note
that even in this graph the dynamic NarrowestFlow problem is
NP-complete in the strong sense in the weighted case. This can
be easily shown by a reduction from 3-Partition: an instance of
3-Partition is given by 3m integers ai, i ∈ {1, . . . , 3m}, which sum
up to m · A, where A/4 < ai < A/2. The question is whether
there are m subsets consisting of 3 integers each s.t. the sum of
the integers in each subset is equal to A. Given such an instance of
3-Partition, we construct a graph consisting of m parallel edges
with free travel time 1 and capacity A each. We also add 3m users
with weights ai, i ∈ {1, . . . , 3m}. It is immediate that a flow has
bottleneck value equal to 1 iff the sum of the weights of the users
on each edge is exactly A, which induces a solution to 3-Partition.
The reason is the following: therewould be an edgewith load lesser
thanA iff therewould be an edgewith load greater thanA. Hence, in
an optimum solution (with bottleneck value 1), each edge has load
exactly A. Since the weights of the users are in (A/4, A/2), there
cannot be four or more users on an edge and there cannot be two
or less users on an edge.
4. The narrowest path problem
In the previous section we showed that finding a dynamic flow
with minimum bottleneck value is hard. In this section we show
that finding a single path with minimum bottleneck value is al-
ready NP-hard, if there is already some flow routed in the network.
This flow already routed before is the reason why the hardness re-
sult does not subsume Theorem1.We need the current hardness ofthe path problem later on to show the hardness of testing whether
a given strategy profile is a Nash equilibrium. Since this is shown
even for the unweighted case, we also show the hardness result in
this section for routing a single unit of flow along the additional
path.
Definition 2 (NarrowestPath Problem).
Input: Instance
Γ = [G = (V , E), (τe, ue)e∈E, k, (sj, tj)j=1,...,k] of
a game with bottleneck objective, flow
f = (fPj)j=1,...,k−1 for k− 1 users and a bound b.
Question: Is there a path Pk for user k s.t. the bottleneck
value bk
f  of that user in the flowf = (fPj)j=1,...,k
with fPk = 1 is smaller or equal to b?
Note that the users already routed have a better priority than the
new user k, who has weight 1.
Theorem 3. NarrowestPath is NP-complete in the strong sense,
even if the graph is acyclic and only a single unit of flow has to be
routed.
Proof. We reduce 3-SAT (see [30]) to NarrowestPath. Suppose
that we are given an instance of 3-SAT. We now construct an
instance of NarrowestPath in polynomial time in such a way that
there is a path with bottleneck value equal to 1 iff there is a Yes-
instance for 3-SAT (the construction is illustrated in Fig. 6).
Construction—clause vertices: For every clause Cj with literals
ℓj1 , ℓj2 , ℓj3 , we add a clause vertex Cj and three literal vertices
ℓ
j
j1
, ℓ
j
j2
, ℓ
j
j3
(so in total, for every literal there will be as many literal
vertices as this literal occurs in the clauses). We add a super source
s and a super termination t . For the ease of notation, the terminal is
also denoted by Cρ+1. The source s is connected to the first clause
vertex C1 via a single edge with high priority.
Construction—literal vertices: For each literal vertex ℓji correspond-
ing to a clause vertex Cj we add a path from the clause to the lit-
eral, i.e., (Cj, v
j
i,1, . . . , v
j
i,ρ−2, ℓ
j
i), consisting of ρ − 1 consecutive
edges with ρ − 2 vertices vji,l with l ∈ {1, . . . , ρ − 2} in between.
We call these vertices preliteral vertices and set vji,ρ−1 = ℓji and
v
j
i,0 = Cj. The last edge entering ℓji has a low priority, while all
other edges have high priority. The exact numbers are not impor-
tant. Furthermore, there is a path (ℓji, w
j
i,1, . . . , w
j
i,ρ−2, Cj+1) con-
sisting of ρ − 1 consecutive edges with ρ − 2 vertices wji,l with
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vertices and setwji,0 = ℓji andwji,ρ−1 = Cj+1. Note that each literal
and each clause vertex belong to the pre- and postliteral vertices,
too. The last edge entering Cj+1 has a high priority, while all other
edges have low priority. Again, the exact numbers are not impor-
tant. All travel times are set to 1 unless stated differently (in the
figure, these are the travel times not stated explicitly).
The distance from s to a preliteral vertex vji,l is given by
τ

v
j
i,l

= (2j − 2)(ρ − 1) + 1 + l and the one from s to a
postliteral vertexwji,l is given by τ

w
j
i,l

= (2j−1)(ρ−1)+1+ l.
Hence, the distance from s to a clause vertex Cj is given by τ

Cj
 =
(2j− 2)(ρ − 1)+ 1 and the distance from s to a literal vertex ℓji is
given by τ

ℓ
j
i

= (2j− 1)(ρ − 1)+ 1.
Construction—bent edges: The important (additional) edges are
those that forbid us using a literal and its negated one. They do not
necessarily connect the two literal vertices directly, but they start
at a preliteral and end at a postliteral in such away that twoof these
edges do not enter at the same vertex. So, let ℓji be a literal vertex
and ℓj
′
i′ be a literal vertex in a later clause, i.e., j
′ > j, corresponding
to the literal that is the negation of the literal corresponding to
the first vertex. We add an edge from the preliteral vertex vji,ρ+j−j′
to the postliteral vertex wj
′
i′,j′−j−1 with travel time τ

w
j′
i,j′−j−1

−
τ

v
j
i,ρ+j−j′

− 1 = 2(j′ − j)ρ − 3 and high priority. These edges
are called bended edges (as they are drawn bent in the picture).
Note that by traversing this edge, one arrives at the postliteral
vertexwj
′
i,j′−j−1 one time unit earlier than by travelling through the
network without these additional edges. The indices l = ρ + j− j′
and l′ = j′ − j − 1 are chosen in such a way that arcs towards a
later clause (large j′) start earlier (smaller l) and arcs from a prior
clause (small j) enter later (larger l′). This gives a nicer picture,
since arcs between two consecutive clause are given by

ℓ
j
i, ℓ
j+1
i′

and do not need the auxiliary vertices v and w. Furthermore, we
add an edge from s to the preliteral vertex vji,ρ+j−j′−1 with travel
time τ

v
j
i,ρ+j−j′−1

= (2j − 2)(ρ − 1) + ρ + j − j′ and low
priority together with an edge from the postliteral vertexwj
′
i,j′−j to
the termination t with travel time 2. Note that this is possible since
ρ + j− j′ − 1 ∈ {0, . . . , ρ − 2} and j′ − j ∈ {1, . . . , ρ − 1}. In the
illustration, edges from the source are only indicated by squiggled
solid lines (one of the two edges to C1 is omitted), and all edges
to the termination are omitted for optical reasons. These edges are
called squiggled edges.
Construction—blocking users: For all pairs of literals and negated
literals in later clauses, we route one user on path

s, vji,ρ+j−j′−1,
v
j
i,ρ+j−j′ , w
j′
i′,j′−j−1, w
j′
i′,j′−j, t

(dashed (blue) paths in the upper
picture). These users are called blocking users and are needed to
forbid the main user traversing a vertex corresponding to a literal
and another vertex corresponding to its negated literal later on.
In total there are not more than 3ρ2 users, and their paths do not
intersect (on an edge) at all. The resulting graph is acyclic, and all
capacities are set to 1.
Remarks. Before we prove that the reduction works, let us briefly
deduce some structural properties about the s–t-path P of an
additional user. This user is also called the main user. The graph
was constructed in such a way that the main user receives a
bottleneck value of at least 2, if she travels along one of the bendededges or travels along an edge at the same time as one of the
blocking users, but with an inferior priority.
Claim 1. The main user arrives at vertex Cj at time τ

Cj
 = (2j −
2)(ρ − 1) + 1 with a bottleneck value of 1 iff she does not travel
along any of the bended or squiggled edges or along an edge as one
of the blocking users at the same time with an inferior priority.
Proof. If the main user has a bottleneck value of 1, then she does
not traverse the edges as claimed above. On the other hand, if she
does not travel along these edges, her travel time on each edge
in her path is equal to 1. Then she arrives at vertex Cj at time
τ

Cj
 = (2j− 2)(ρ − 1)+ 1. ▹
Claim 2. If main user arrives at vertex Cj at time τ

Cj

with a
bottleneck value of 1, then all blocking users are slowed down by
one time unit on their first common edge with the main user.
Proof. Let the first edge blocking a user and the main user traverse
at the same time be edge e = (vji,ρ+j−j′−1, vji,ρ+j−j′). Then the
main user arrives at the starting vertex at time τ

v
j
i,ρ+j−j′−1

=
(2j − 2)(ρ − 1) + ρ + j − j′ and the blocking user arrives also at
time τ

v
j
i,ρ+j−j′−1

= (2j− 2)(ρ − 1)+ ρ + j− j′. Since the edge
of the main user has a better priority, the blocking user has to wait
in the waiting queue for one time unit and hence, reaches the end
vertex of the edge one time unit after the main user. ▹
Claim 3. If the main user traverses a literal vertex and a corre-
sponding negated literal vertex afterwards, then her bottleneck
value is at least 2.
Proof. Let the main user traverse vertex ℓji corresponding to a lit-
eral ℓ and vertex ℓj
′
i′ corresponding to the negated literal ℓ after-
wards in such a way that the travel time on each edge up to vertex
ℓ
j′
i′ is given by 1. Then there is a bended edge between a preliteral
vertex vji,ρ+j−j′ and a postliteral vertex w
j′
i′,j′−j−1. Both vertices are
traversed by the main user and a blocking user, who are slowed
downby themain user by one timeunit on the edge towards vertex
v
j
i,ρ+j−j′ , where she arrives one unit of time after themain user (see
Claim 2). Since the travel time of the bended edge is one time unit
less than the path along the clause vertices, the main user and the
blocking user both arrive at vertex wj
′
i′,j′−j−1 at time τ

w
j′
i′,j′−j−1

.
Then the main user and the blocking user both traverse the edge
e′ =

w
j′
i′,j′−j−1, w
j′
i′,j′−j

. Since the bended edge of the blocking
users has a better priority than the edge of themain user, the travel
time of the main user on edge e′ is increased by one and hence, her
bottleneck value cannot be 1 any more. ▹
Main Claim. There is a path with bottleneck value≤1 iff there is a
satisfying assignment for the instance of 3-SAT.
⇐H: Let T be a satisfying truth assignment. So, in any clause Cj
there is at least one literal that is set to true.Wewill denote this lit-
eral by ℓij and the corresponding literal node by ℓ
j
ij
. If there is more
than one true literal in Cj, we pick an arbitrary one.
We route the new user from the source s to the first clause node
C1, from a clause node Cj to the literal node ℓ
j
ij
corresponding to the
true literal ℓij in the clause Cj and then to the next clause node Cj+1
up to the termination node Cρ+1 = t . This is a feasible path which
by the analysis above has bottleneck value 1, since it traverses none
of the bended edges and no literal vertex and a negated literal ver-
tex later on.
H⇒: Assume conversely that there is a path P with bottleneck
value 1 for the main user. Then the path cannot traverse any of the
T.L. Werth et al. / Operations Research Perspectives 1 (2014) 18–41 27Fig. 7. Illustration of themodelling of 3-SAT for the reduction toNashTest. The numbers near the edges are the travel times. If there is no number near an arc, then its travel
time is 1. The letters give the priority of ingoing arcs. The dashed (blue) paths belong to the blocking users, the solid (red) path to the main user and the dotted (black) paths
are not used at all. (For interpretation of the references to colour in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)bended edges with travel time greater than 1. Furthermore, path
P cannot intersect with the same blocking user more than once by
Claim 3. So the new path does not go from a literal node to a node
of the negated literal. Then, the path implies a truth assignment for
3-SAT, since it traverses the node corresponding to one of the lit-
erals in each clause and never enters a node of a literal and one of
its negated literal. 
Remark. Note that the reduction also works for the global tie-
breaking rule, if the blocking users get best priorities, themain user
gets a normal priority, and for each blocking user an additional
auxiliary user is added with bad priority. Furthermore, the main
user and the auxiliary users have to arrive at the verticeswhere the
main user delayed the blocking users in the reduction from above
at the same time and one time unit before the blocking user. If the
travel times of the blocking users are decreased accordingly, then
one can show that the blocking user is again delayed and the equiv-
alence from above is still true. 
Note that in extension-parallel graphs [31] the narrowest path
problem becomes polynomial-time solvable: there are only O(n)
different paths from s to t and one can exhaustively search for the
best one.
5. Nash equilibria in games with bottleneck objective
We have seen that there may be instances without a Nash
equilibrium (Example 2). The first non-trivial class of graphs are
those consisting of parallel links and an additional edge afterwards
with unit free travel times and capacities. One can show that these
always have a Nash equilibrium, which can be stated explicitly.
On the other hand, easy examples show that even in extension-
parallel graphs, no Greedy type algorithm is guaranteed to find a
Nash equilibrium (if one exists). But, the situation is even worse in
the dynamic setting: we show that the question whether a given
strategy profile is a Nash equilibrium is already co-NP-complete,
the question whether a given instance has a Nash equilibrium is
NP-complete and the Price of Anarchy is very high.
5.1. Complexity of the dynamic NashTest problem
In this section we show that deciding whether a given strategy
profile is a Nash equilibrium or not is co-NP-complete for multi-
commodity instances, even for unweighted users.
Definition 3 (NashTest Problem).
Input: Instance
Γ = [G = (V , E), (τe, ue)e∈E, k, (sj, tj)j=1,...,k] of
a game with bottleneck objective and a flow
f = (fPj)j=1,...,k for k users.
Question: Is f is a Nash equilibrium?Corollary 4. NashTest is co-NP-complete in the strong sense for
multi-commodity instances, even if all users are unweighted and the
graph is acyclic.
Proof. The problem is in co-NP, since given a strategy profile and
an alternative strategy for one of the users it is easy to see whether
this strategy is better than the old one or not.
To show the hardness we reduce 3-SAT toNashTest. In order to
do that we modify the reduction to NarrowestPath slightly (see
Fig. 6) s.t. the blocking users do not have any intention to change
their strategies:
We add an additional vertex h between the source s and the first
clause vertex C1 and two arcs (s, h) and (h, C1) with travel time 1
together with an arc from h to t with travel time 2. Furthermore,
all travel times of arcs leaving s added for the blocking users
are increased by 1, too. Since in the NashTest problem also the
blocking users are not satisfied with high bottleneck values, the
travel time of any single edge has to be not higher than 2. To
achieve that, all arcs with travel times ≥2 (those above and
these from literal vertices to negated literal vertices added for the
blocking users) are replaced by paths consisting of consecutive
arcs, where at least one of the arcs in each of these paths has
travel time 2 and the others have travel times 1 or 2 such that the
travel time of the path is equal to the travel time of the old arc.
The capacity of all arcs is equal to the capacity of the old arc. All
other travel times between the drawn vertices, all capacities and
priorities stay the same due to this change.
To complete the instance of NashTest we provide the flow
that has to be tested. This flow is given as follows: the block-
ing users take the same paths as the blocking users in the
NarrowestPath instance with the exception that they do not use
the old single arcs, since these have been replaced by the newpaths
of consecutive arcs as discussed above. The paths are indicated by
squiggled solid and dashed (blue) edges in the picture. Note that
the edges towards the termination are omitted for optical reasons
as for the NarrowestPath instance. The main user (who has high-
est priority) is routed from s to h with travel time 1 and then to t
with bottleneck value 2 (solid (red) path). The whole illustration
can be seen in Fig. 7.
Then none of the blocking users on the dashed (blue) paths
can improve, since they receive their bottleneck value on their
first arcs and the only possible change to arc (s, h) also gives a
bottleneck value of at least 2, because the main user takes this
arc with a higher priority at the same time. The main user has
a bottleneck value of 2. We know from our last reduction to
NarrowestPath that there is a path with bottleneck value 1 in-
side the network iff there is a Yes-instance for 3-SAT. So, exactly in
this case there is a path themain user can change to and hence, the
strategy profile is no Nash equilibrium. 
Furthermore, one can show analogously by reducing Longest-
Path toNashTest that the problem is also co-NP-hard in the single-
commodity case in general graphs.
28 T.L. Werth et al. / Operations Research Perspectives 1 (2014) 18–41Fig. 8. Illustration of the reduction from 3-SAT to NashExistence. The first expression near an edge is its travel time, the second one its capacity. The small numbers at
ingoing edges near vertices state the priorities of the edges. The upper graph is from the reduction from 3-SAT to NarrowestFlow used in the proof of Theorem 1, the left
graph from Example 2. The exact travel times, capacities and priorities for the edges in these subgraphs can be found in the corresponding sections.5.2. Complexity of the dynamic NashExistence problem
In this section we show that deciding whether a given instance
has a Nash equilibrium or not is NP-hard for multi-commodity
instances, even for unweighted users.
Theorem 5. The NashExistence problem is NP-hard in the strong
sense in the multi-commodity case, even if the graph is acyclic and all
users are unweighted.
Proof. The hardness is shown with a reduction similar to the one
for theNarrowestFlow problem in the two-commodity case from
Theorem 1. Again, an instance of 3-SAT is given by a set of Boolean
variables X = x0, . . . , xη−1, and ρ clauses (Cj)j=1,...,ρ containing
exactly three literals. The idea behind the subsequent construction
follows from two former results:
We already know that the graph GD constructed in the proof of
Theorem 1 with one user routing for the first commodity can be
traversed with a bottleneck value of 1 iff the instance of 3-SAT is a
feasible truth assignment. Otherwise, the bottleneck is at least 2.
On the other hand, without this user from the first commodity,
the remaining k − 1 users can always route through the graph
with bottleneck value 1 (independently on the instance of the
3-SAT problem).
Furthermore, we have seen in Example 2 an instance with a
graph GN that has no Nash equilibrium if there is a single user
routing for its first commodity. Additionally, there is always a path
with bottleneck value 1 for this user and never a path with smaller
travel time. Without this user every feasible strategy of the other
users gives a Nash equilibrium.
We add both graphs in one supergraph. First we add a super
source s and connect it to the source s1 of the first commodity in
both graphs via an edgewith travel time 1. Note that the vertices in
the graph GN are denoted with a tilde s.t. they can be distinguished
from those in the graph GD. We add a super terminal t and connect
the terminal of the first commodity in GN to this terminal via anedge with travel time 1. The capacities of all of these edges are
set to 1. Next, we have to make sure that the user from the first
commodity in GD always suffers (i.e., has bottleneck value ≥2) if
the flow has bottleneck value higher than 1. To that end we need
to extend the instance a little bit, by adding vertices s′3, t
′
2, u, w and
t ′1 and the following edges:
Edge (s′3, t2) (t2, t
′
2) (t2, w) (t1, u) (u, w) (w, t
′
1) (t
′
1, t)
Travel
time
T 1 2 1 1 1 1
Capacity 1 ρ 1 1 1 1 1
The former users from commodity 2 in GD now route from s2
to t ′2 and are called clause users. We add an additional blocking
user, who routes from s′3 to t
′
1. The users from the first commodity
in both graphs are merged to one user, who routes from the new
super source s to the new super terminal t and is called the main
user here. All other users from graph GN have the same sources
and terminals as before. The priorities are only important at a few
vertices (indicated with small number and a closing bracket at
the end of the edges in the figure): the edge (s′3, t2) receives the
lowest priority of all edges entering t2 and the edge (t1, w) receives
the lowest priority of all edges entering w. All other priorities are
chosen arbitrarily. The whole illustration can be seen in Fig. 8.
Claim 1.We have seen in Example 2 that in the graph GN there is
always a path for the user from commodity 1with bottleneck value
1. But then the user from the second commodity in this graph is not
satisfied with her path.
Claim 2. The user from commodity 1 never routes along t2, since
the travel time on edge (t ′2, w) is 2 and, by Claim 1, there is always
a path with travel time 1.
Claim 3. Iff the flow of the clause users in the subgraph GD (with
the modifications made above) has bottleneck value ≥2, then the
user from commodity 1 cannot route through the subgraph with a
bottleneck value equal to 1.
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Fig. 9. Instance with a bad Price of Anarchy (a). Every thick edge represents a path of a number of edges in a row, where the number is written near the edge. The small
numbers with closing brackets near edges entering vertices denote the priorities of these edges. Two different strategy profiles are drawn on the right. Here, the dashed
(blue) or solid (red) paths are used by the users, while the dotted (grey) paths are empty. (For interpretation of the references to colour in this figure legend, the reader is
referred to the web version of this article.)Proof. In the graph GD with the modifications made above, the
clause users arrive at vertex t2 at time T if none of them is slowed
down before. At this time the user from s′3 also arrives at vertex t2.
Since her edge has a lower priority the user has towait for one time
unit. Then she arrives at vertexw at time T +4. On the other hand,
if at least one of the clause users arrives at least one time unit later
at t2, then the user from s′3 arrives at vertexw at time T + 3.
The user from commodity 1 also traverses this vertex when
routing through GD. If she is not slowed down by any other user (in
that case she has bottleneck value ≥2), then she arrives at vertex
w at time T + 3. Since her edge has a lower priority than the edge
of the blocking user, she is slowed down by this user and receives
bottleneck value at least 2, if this user also arrives there at time
T + 3. ▹
Main Claim. There is a feasible truth assignment for the 3-SAT
instance iff there is Nash equilibrium in the enhanced instance.
Proof. Now assume that there is a feasible truth assignment for
the 3-SAT instance. By the previous theorem we can route the
user from commodity 1 along a path from s to t1 with bottleneck
value 1 and travel time T . The clause users can also be routed with
bottleneck value 1 and travel time T to the vertex t2. Since they
have a better priority than the blocking user from s′3, they reach
their terminal t ′2 at time T + 1, which is best possible. By Claim 3
the main user traverses the edge (w, t ′1) with travel time 1, since
the blocking user is slowed down by the clause users. Hence, the
main user arrives at her terminal t with bottleneck value equal
to 1. Without the user from the first commodity in the graph GN ,
there is also aNash equilibrium in this graph. Hence, there is a Nash
equilibrium for the enhanced instance.
Assume conversely that there is no feasible truth assignment
for the 3-SAT instance. Then any flowwith one user routing for the
first commodity in the graph GD has bottleneck value at least 2.
By Claim 3 the main user receives bottleneck value ≥2, when
routing through the subgraph GD. Since there is always a path in
GN with bottleneck value 1 by Claim 1, she changes her path to this
graph. Hence, there cannot be a Nash equilibrium in this case in the
enhanced instance. 
5.3. Price of anarchy in games with bottleneck objective
In this section we give tight bounds on the Price of Anarchy and
the strong Price of Anarchy. More precisely, we show that both
are equal to the number of users both in the unweighted and in
the weighted case. Note that besides the weight of the users, thefree transit times, capacities and number of commodities are not
important for our results.
For a set of instances G the (strong) Price of Anarchy is defined as
the maximum ratio of the worst social objective of a (strong) Nash
equilibrium in comparison to the social optimum, i.e., for a game
with bottleneck objective we have
PoA(G ) = sup
Γ ∈G
sup
fNE in Γ
b(f )
opt(Γ )
sPoA(G ) = sup
Γ ∈G
sup
f SE in Γ
b(f )
opt(Γ )
.
Theorem 6. The (strong) Price of Anarchy is bounded from above
by k.
Proof. We show that PoA ≤ k, even in the weighted case. Let P be
a path of a heaviest user with weight w in an optimal solution f ∗.
The bottleneck of the user is called b ≥ 1 and the bottleneck of the
strategy profile is b∗ ≥ b.
All edges in path P have at least capacityw (otherwise the user
could not route there) and so every additional user cannot increase
the latency by more than 1. If all k users take any of the edges of
this path P at the same time, then the last onewill receive a latency
≤ b+ k− 1.
Assume that there is a Nash equilibrium f together with a user
with bottleneck value higher than b+k−1. Then she can change to
path P . Since at most all users can traverse the edges of that path at
the same time, the bottleneck on that path is bounded from above
by b + k − 1. So f cannot be a Nash equilibrium and hence the
ratio of the objective of a worst Nash equilibrium to the optimal
objective is at most (b+ k− 1)/b∗ ≤ 1+ (k− 1)/b∗ ≤ k. 
Our next example shows that the above bound is in fact tight:
Example 4. Consider the graph from Fig. 9 with free transit
times 1, capacities 1 and k unweighted users. There are two dif-
ferent strong equilibria.
The first strategy profile (see picture (b)) routes every user
on one of the k disjoint paths denoted by P1 = (s, v1, t), Pj =
(s, uj, vj, t) for j ∈ {2, . . . , k− 1} and Pk = (s, uk, t). Then every
user has a bottleneck value of 1, and hence the strategy profile is a
strong equilibrium with bottleneck value 1.
We show that the strategy profile from picture (c) is also a
strong equilibrium and has bottleneck value k. It routes user j ∈
{1, . . . , k} on path P j = (s, v1, u2, v2, . . . , vk−1, uk, t). These paths
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each other only on the subpaths from vi−1 to ui for i ∈ {2, . . . , k}.
We assume that path Pj always uses the subpath from vi−1 to ui
with priority aj, i.e., the subpath consisting of k− j+ 1 edges in a
row.
So, user jwith priority j is routed on path P j with latency j on the
first edge (s, v1) and arrives in v1 at time j. Afterwards she takes the
subpath from v1 to u2 with k− j+1 edges and arrives in u2 at time
k+1 and so on. So, all users arrive at vertex ui at time (i−1)(k+1)
for all i ∈ {2, . . . , k} and user j receives bottleneck value j for all
j ∈ {1, . . . , k}.
We show by induction on j that a coalition C of users who can
change their strategies simultaneously in order to improve their
bottleneck values cannot contain any of the users from 1 to j.
For j = 1 this is easy since user 1 has bottleneck value 1, and
hence she has no incentive to change her strategy. The step is done
from j − 1 to j. We have to show that user j cannot be part of any
improving coalition if users q < j keep their strategies. Then user j
has the highest priority of all users of the coalition. If user jwants to
decrease her bottleneck value, she has to leave edge (s, v1). Assume
that user j changes to the edge (s, ui) for some i ∈ {2, . . . , k}. Note
that all users q < j are not affected by the change of the users of the
coalition and arrive at vertex ui at time (i−1)(k+1) because of the
structure of the graph. User j arrives there also at time (i−1)(k+1),
and her edge has a lower priority than those of users 1 to q. Since all
of these users have to use edge (ui, vi) afterwards, user j receives
at least bottleneck value j. So, she cannot improve by changing her
path, and hence the strategy profile is a strong equilibrium with
bottleneck value k. ▹
Note that this is exactly the same value as the Price of Anarchy
in the static case (see e.g. [28]). But, the strong Price of Anarchy
is much higher than in the static case, where it is given by 2.
The reason behind this is the latency model. In the dynamic
case simultaneous arrival worsens only the latter users in the
equilibrium very badly, while the optimum solution can traverse
the network with low cost. In the static case, however, users in a
strong equilibrium suffer together and hence form a coalition to
improve their situation.
6. Quickest flows
In this and the remaining sectionswe change the objective from
the bottleneck to the sum case. We show that computing a flow
with minimum makespan value can be done in polynomial time
with the help of a maximum (dynamic) flow computation in the
unweighted single-commodity case. Suppose that we are given a
time horizon T . All flow has to start at time 0 in a source vertex
s and reach the terminal vertex t by time T . The question of the
maximum (dynamic) flow problem is how much flow can be sent
from s to t in the specified time period.We stress thatwe look at an
atomic variant of a continuousmodel, and it turns out that the flow
sent at time θ is sent in the continuous model in the time interval
[θ, θ + 1).
We briefly repeat the necessary concepts of standard dynamic
network flows. Let G = (V , E) be a graph with a (single) source
sink pair (s, t), free travel times τe and capacities ue. For an edge
e ∈ E, we denote by α(e) its starting vertex and by ω(e) its end
vertex.
Let fe(θ) be the amount of flow on edge e at time θ . Then the
excess at vertex v for the flow f at time t is given by
excessf (v, t) =

e∈δ−(v)
t
θ=0
fe(θ)−

e∈δ+(v)
t
θ=0
fe(θ), (1)
where δ+(v) ⊆ E are the edges emanating from v and δ−(v) ⊆ E
are those entering v.
Let the time horizon be T . Then fe(θ) = 0 for θ ∉ [0, T − τe].Definition 4 (Dynamic Network Flow). A dynamic network flow
with time horizon T is a flow f with 0 ≤ fe(θ) ≤ ue for all
e ∈ E, excessf (v, t) ≥ 0 for all v ∈ V \ {s, t} , t ∈ [0, T ] and
excessf (v, T ) = 0 for all v ∈ V \ {s, t}.
The amount of flow sent from the source to the sink is called value
of the flow and it is given by val(f ) = −excessf (s, T ).
Definition 5. A dynamic cut with time horizon T is a function X :
[0, T + 1)→ 2V s.t.
s ∈ X(θ) ⊆ V \ {t} for all θ ∈ [0, T + 1)
X(θ1) ⊆ X(θ2) for θ1 ≤ θ2.
For a dynamic cut X and a vertex v ∈ V the earliest point in time
when v enters X is given by ξv := min({θ : v ∈ X(θ)} ∪ {T + 1}).
Then ξs = 0 and ξt = T + 1. We define these values up to time
T + 1, since the last units of flow have to enter the terminal t up
to time T , and hence there is no more flow in the network at time
T + 1.
A dynamic cut can be viewed as a cut which ‘‘grows over time’’.
At any given time θ ∈ [0, T + 1) we have that (X(θ), V \ X(θ)) is
a static s–t-cut. An edge e = (u, v) lies in the dynamic cut if flow
leaves vertex u at time ξu or later and enters vertex v before time
ξv . The capacity U of a dynamic cut X with time horizon T equals
the amount of flow that can be sent along the edges of Gwhile they
are in the cut, i.e.,
U(X) :=

e=(u,v)∈E
max{0, ξv − τe − ξu} · ue. (2)
It is well known that the maximum value of a dynamic flow
and the minimum value of a dynamic cut coincide, see e.g. [9]. A
central tool for finding a maximum dynamic flow is the concept of
a temporally repeated flow:
Definition 6 (Temporally Repeated Flow). Given a static flow fˆ and
a decomposition into a set of pathsP , which send fˆP units of flow
along path P ∈ P . Then a temporally repeated flow f T with time
horizon T is defined as follows: for P ∈ P it sends during the time
interval [0, T − τP ] exactly fˆP units of flow along path P , where
τP = e∈P τe is the length of path P . The total flow value sent by
f T is thus val(f T ) =P∈P fˆP(T − τP).
It is alsowell-known that amaximum temporally repeated flow
yields a maximum dynamic flow, see e.g. [32–34]. Thus, the value
of a maximum temporally repeated flow equals the minimum
value of a dynamic cut. To find a maximum temporally repeated
flow one computes a minimum cost circulation fˆ in the static
model after introducing a back edge from t to s with infinite
capacity and travel time−(T+1) in polynomial time. Note that the
cost of the back edge of−(T + 1) is chosen because of the atomic
model, while in the continuous case the cost is only−T .
Let us nowproceed to flows in the deterministic queuingmodel.
A dynamic flow f in the deterministic queuing model is given by a
number of paths (Pj)j=1,...,k and the number of users who are sent
along these paths (fPj)j=1,...,k.
We let f ωe (t) ≥ 0 be the amount of flow that leaves edge e to
vertex ω(e) at time t, f αe (t) ≥ 0 be the amount of flow that enters
edge e from the starting vertex α(e) at time t, fe(t) ≥ 0 be the
amount of flow on edge e at time t , i.e.,
fe(t) =
t
θ=0
f αe (θ)−
t
θ=0
f ωe (θ)
and f qe (t) be the amount of flow that waits in the waiting queue of
edge e at time t .
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waiting queue, so we have:
f qe (t) = max

0, f qe (t − 1)− ue
+ f αe (t − τe). (3)
The flow from the queue leaving an edge has to obey the capacity
constraints, and thus
f ωe (t) = min

ue, f qe (t)

. (4)
We say that the dynamic flow f has time horizon T if all flow values
fe(t), f
q
e (t), f αe (t), f
ω
e (t) are zero for t > T and all edges e ∈ E. The
excess in a vertex v at time t is defined as
excessf (v, t) =

e∈δ−(v)
t
θ=0
f ωe (θ)−

e∈δ+(v)
t
θ=0
f αe (θ). (5)
Sincewaiting in vertices is not allowedwe have excessf (v, t) =
0 for all v ∈ V \ {s, t}.
The value of a dynamic flow f in the deterministic queuing
model is also defined to be val(f ) = −excessf (s, T ). Note that
the model above actually reduces to the flow over time model if
f ωe (t) = f qe (t) = f αe (t − τe). For the sake of an easier notation
we set all flow and excess values to be zero for t < 0. It is easy
to see that a maximum flow can be computed the same way as in
the standard (atomic version of the) flow over timemodel by using
temporally repeated flows. The only difference is that all flow starts
at the source at time 0 and that flow beyond the capacity of an edge
is able to wait in the waiting queue of an edge later on.
We now show that the capacity of any dynamic cut is an upper
bound for the flowvalue of any flow in the dynamic queuingmodel.
The proof is along the same lines as for the standard dynamic flow
model and is contained in the Appendix for completeness.We note
that the result cannot be deduced directly from the literature, since
all flow has to leave the source s at time 0 in the deterministic
queuing model and has to be stored in the some of the waiting
queues later on.
Theorem 7. For any dynamic flow f in the deterministic queuing
model and any dynamic cut X (both with time horizon T) we have:
val(f ) ≤ U(X).
Proof. See Appendix A. 
The next step is to show that a temporally repeated flow in the
flow over timemodel can be converted to a flow in the deterministic
queuing model with the same flow value. Since there is a tempo-
rally repeated flow with the same flow value as the capacity of a
dynamic cut the resulting flow is maximum. We stress here that,
although we use the maximum dynamic flow from the standard
model, the optimality result in our case does not follow directly
from the literature, since the conversion has to take care about the
queues and the buffering at the vertices.
For the conversion, we use the minimum cost circulation fˆ
which gives rise to the maximum temporally repeated flow in the
standard dynamic flow model. Let P be the paths used by the
circulation, fˆP be the flow rate and τP the length of path P ∈ P .
Then f T sends fˆP units of flow at every time θ ∈ [0, T − τP ] along
that path. The task of our algorithm is to send the same amount of
flow along the same edges in such an order that they arrive within
the time horizon in the deterministic queuing model. To that end
we state the following definitions:Pe = {P ∈ P | e ∈ P} are the
paths traversing the edge e ∈ E, FP = fˆP · (T + 1− τP) is the total
flow sent along path P and F = P∈P FP is the total amount of
flow sent along all paths together, which equals the capacity of the
minimal dynamic cut.
A general version of the algorithm can be seen in Algorithm 1
in Appendix A. The idea is the following. The algorithm allocatesat least the same amount of flow as in the temporally repeated
flow to all paths at the edges leaving the source. Then, this amount
of flow is available for allocation at the subsequent edges. Here,
it is allocated again as in the temporally repeated flow. To that
end flow rates per time for points in time (from a list Te) where
some of the flow rates at edge e change are computed by the
algorithm iteratively. Between two of these times from the list the
flow rates remain constant. In the algorithm, first the flow rate is
made available for the next edge e in path P ∈ Pe or the first
edge of the path at the beginning. Then some amount of that rate is
allocated to path P at edge e, which is then available for allocation
at the subsequent edge eP in path P . Here, a new entry stating the
time and the amount of flow available is added to the list TeP of
edge eP .
Theorem 8. Let f T be a maximum temporally repeated flow with
time horizon T . Then Algorithm 1 transforms f T into a maximum flow
in the deterministic queuing model in polynomial time.
Proof. See Appendix A. 
6.1. The quickest flow problem
We now use the results about maximum dynamic flows in the
deterministic queuing model to show that the problem of finding
a flow with minimum makespan value is easy to solve in the
unweighted single-commodity case.
Definition 7 (Quickest Flow problem).
Input: Instance
Γ = [G = (V , E), (τe, ue)e∈E, k, (s, t)] and a
bound T .
Question: Is there a feasible flow for that instance with
makespan objective smaller or equal to T?
Theorem 9. The Quickest Flow problem is solvable in polynomial
time in the unweighted single-commodity case.
Proof. Given an instance of the Quickest Flow problem, i.e., a
graph, k units of flow, and a bound T for the travel time, the ques-
tion is whether there is a feasible flow for k units of flow with
makespan smaller or equal to T . By Theorem 8, a maximum flow
with time horizon T can be computed in polynomial time. If the
flow value is at least k, then we have found a solution for the
Quickest Flow problem. If the flow value is smaller than k, then
there is no solution for the Quickest Flow problem. 
Note that in the weighted case the problem becomes NP-
complete with a reduction from the 3-Partition problem to the
Quickest Flow problem in a network consisting of parallel links. In
themulti-commodity case the problem also becomesNP-complete
with a reduction from the 3-SAT problem as in [29] after introduc-
ing travel times in such a way that there is a feasible assignment
iff there is a flow with makespan equal to some given value (see
Appendix B.2).
7. Nash equilibria in games with sum objective
In this section we show that a Greedy type strategy computes
a Nash equilibrium in a weighted single-commodity game with
sum objective. For this reason, we restrict ourselves to the case
that users with small weight have a better priority than users with
larger weight (as in [20]). The reason is that users with a bad
priority should not be able to use paths users with a good priority
cannot use.
In an empty network there is always a shortest path with the
property that every subpath is also a shortest path, since that
case is equivalent to the static shortest path problem. Routing
the first user with highest priority along such a path, a second
user originating from the same source cannot enter a common
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second user is not smaller than the weight of the first user, since
otherwise she might overtake her on an edge the other user could
not traverse). They might enter the edge at the same time, but
because of the global priorities of the user, the first one leaves
the common edge first and hence cannot be overtaken by the
second user. Continuingwith this approach gives an algorithm that
iteratively routes users along a shortest path in the network, where
the flow of the users with better priority is already routed. This is
not an arbitrary shortest path, but one that arrives at every vertex
in the path as early as possible. If there are multiple paths with the
same travel time, one of them is picked arbitrarily. More formally:
Definition 8 (Earliest Arrival Path). An earliest arrival path P with
weight w in an empty network is an s–t-path s.t. for each vertex
v ∈ P the travel time of the subpath P(s,v) from s to v is minimum.
Let fk−1 = (fP j)j∈{1,...,k−1} be a flow, where user q ∈ {1, . . . ,
k− 1} is routed on an earliest arrival s–tq-path with weight wq in
the network where flow fq−1 = (fP j)j=1,...,q−1 is already routed.
Then an earliest arrival path Pk with weight wk in the network
with flow fk−1 already routed is an s–tk-path s.t. for each vertex v ∈
Pk the travel time of the subpath Pk(s,v) from s to v isminimum in the
resulting flow f = fk−1+wkδPk . Here, δP denotes a flow that sends
one unit of flow along path P and no other edge. Hence, f = fk−1+
wkδPk is the flow fk−1 withwk additional units of flow on path Pk.
The resulting flow f is called an earliest arrival path flow.
The analysis above shows how to compute such an earliest
arrival path flow. Hence, it always exists. By definition, a user with
some priority on her path does not influence the travel times of all
users with better priority, since she never overtakes any of them.
That means on the other hand that the travel time of a user on an
edge does not depend on the load of the other users with worse
priority.
Observation 10. Let fk = (fP j)j∈{1,...,k} be an earliest arrival path flow
for k users. Then the travel time on each edge e ∈ Pq for user q stays
the same, if all users with inferior priority are removed, i.e., ℓe,q(fq) =
ℓe,q(fk).
By the analysis above, a user who chooses to delay another user
with lower priority on some edge does not have to suffer from the
result of that choice later on, since the other user cannot overtake
her. Hence, the travel time on the edges does not depend on the
choice of previous edges. The result is stated more formally in the
following:
Observation 11. Let fk = (fP j)j∈{1,...,k} be an earliest arrival path
flow for k users in the graph G = (V , E), where P j is the s–tj-path
of user j ∈ {1, . . . , k} with weight wj and e = (v,w) ∈ Pk
be an edge user k enters at time t. Furthermore, consider the graph
G′ = (V , E ∪ e′, e′′)with e′ ∉ E an additional edge from the source
s to vertex vwith travel time t and capacity 1 and e′′ ∉ E an additional
edge fromvertexw to the terminal tk with travel time 1 and capacity 1.
Then the travel time of user k on edge e in the flow f in the graph G
is equal to the travel time of user k on edge e in the flow f ′ in the graph
G′, where f ′ = f − wkδPk + wkδPk is the flow where user k changed
from path Pk to the new pathPk = (s, e′, v, e, w, e′′, t).
From this second observation it follows immediately that an al-
gorithm that aims at computing an earliest arrival path flow only
needs the load of the users already traversing an edge, the load of
the current user, and the time she enters the edge to compute her
travel time on it. Her choices on previous edges and users added
after her are irrelevant. Hence, an earliest arrival path can be com-
puted with a slightly modified Dijkstra algorithm. By storing the
load at the last point in time a user left an edge from the previousiterations, the current travel times can be computed easily. Note
that the paths cannot be sorted by their length at the beginning,
since the latency depends on the waiting time of the users who are
already routed. So, it is not precisely a Greedy algorithm.
Proposition 1. Every single-source game with sum-objective has a
Nash equilibrium, even if the users are weighted.
In particular, the earliest arrival path flow computed with an
algorithm that iteratively computes earliest arrival paths gives such
a Nash equilibrium in polynomial time.
Proof. With the observations above it follows immediately that
the resulting flow is an earliest arrival path flow. So, we only have
to show that an earliest arrival path flow is also a Nash flow. Take
a look at some user j. By the observation above no user who was
allocated after her can slow her down or any of the users who
were allocated before her. So she and the users whowere allocated
before her have the same latency values they had when choosing
their paths. Since she chooses a shortest path and no path length
decreases due to additional users, she cannot change to another
path and improve her objective. 
This shows that aGreedy type algorithm computes aNash equi-
librium in the weighted single source case. Note that this pro-
cedure does not work if there are users with large weight and
good priority, since in that case they can be overtaken by users
with small weight on an edge with small capacity. Furthermore,
the procedure does not work in the weighted multi-commodity
case, since an instance compared to Example 2 in the game with
bottleneck objective can be constructed easily, which shows that
also in the sum case there are instances without a Nash equilib-
rium (see Appendix B.1). Additionally, the NashTest problem is
NP-hard to answer in the weighted single-commodity case or the
unweighted multi-commodity case. These results can be shown
with essentially the same reductions as in the bottleneck case. The
NashExistence problem is alsoNP-hard to answer in the weighted
multi-commodity case with essentially the same reduction as in
the bottleneck case.We include the proof forNashExistence in Ap-
pendix B.3.
Comparing our results to Hoefer et al. [20] one sees that
existence and computation complexity are very similar. However,
the results cannot be obtained from their model for several
reasons: in our model users only increase the travel time of users
after them, while in [20] users entering an edge at the same time
increase the travel time of all of these users. Moreover, the latency
functions on edges in their model can be chosen in such a way that
in any reasonable strategy profile an edge is used only by a single
user, while an additional user in the deterministic queuing model
increases the travel time only by a value of 1. Nevertheless, it is
obvious that due to the atomic, dynamic setting in both models
the computation complexity of a path with optimal objective in a
network with other users already routed is NP-hard.
8. Conclusions
In this paperwe investigated atomic dynamic routing games for
a deterministic queuing model for sum and bottleneck objectives.
We showed that quickest flows and Nash equilibria in the sum
version can be computed efficiently, while the computation of
narrowest paths/flows or Nash equilibria in the bottleneck version
are NP-hard. Our work raises several challenging questions: first,
what conditions ensure that Nash equilibria exist in the bottleneck
case and when can such an equilibrium be computed efficiently?
Second, how can the model be modified in such a way that in the
atomic case more problems become tractable (and still the model
can be considered ‘‘realistic’’)?
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Here we give the proofs from Section 6 that have been omitted
before. The first lemma establishes some basic properties of
dynamic flows in the deterministic queuing model.
Lemma 12. For any dynamic flow f in the deterministic queuing
model with time horizon T and any edge e ∈ E, and moment in time
t ≥ 0, it holds that the difference between flow entering edge e up to
time t − τe and flow leaving the edge up to time t is given by the size
of the waiting queue after time t, that is,
t−τe
θ=0
f αe (θ)−
t
θ=0
f ωe (θ) = max

f qe (t)− ue, 0
 ≥ 0. (A.1)
At the end (time horizon T) flow that entered edge e also left the edge,
i.e.,
T
θ=0
f αe (θ) =
T
θ=0
f ωe (θ). (A.2)
The amount of flow leaving the outgoing edges from v ∈ V after time
t + τe must be at least as high as the amount of flow entering v after
time t. More precisely

e∈δ+(v)
T
θ=t+τe
f ωe (θ)−

e∈δ−(v)
T
θ=t
f ωe (θ) ≥ 0. (A.3)
Proof. Let f be a dynamic flow in the deterministic queuingmodel
with time horizon T , e ∈ E, t ≥ 0. An easy calculation yields:
t−τe
θ=0
f αe (θ) =
t
θ=τe
f αe (θ − τe) =
t
θ=0
f αe (θ − τe)
(3)=
t
θ=0
f qe (θ)−max

0, f qe (θ − 1)− ue

=
t
θ=0
f qe (θ)−
t
θ=0
max

0, f qe (θ − 1)− ue

=
t
θ=0
f qe (θ)−
t−1
θ=0
max

0, f qe (θ)− ue

=
t
θ=0
f qe (θ)−
t
θ=0
max

0, f qe (θ)− ue

+ max f qe (t)− ue, 0 . (A.4)
If f qe (θ) > ue, then we have:
f qe (θ)−max{0, f qe (θ)− ue} = f qe (θ)− (f qe (θ)− ue) = ue
= min{ue, f qe (t)} (4)= f ωe (θ).
On the other hand, if f qe (θ) < ue, then
f qe (θ)−max{0, f qe (θ)− ue} = f qe (θ) = min{f qe (θ), ue}
(4)= f ωe (θ).
Using the above two calculations in (A.4) now yields the first claim
of the lemma.
We proceed with the second claim. After the last time step the
waiting queue has to be empty. So we must have that f qe (T ) ≤ ue.
Furthermore, any flow entering after time T − τe cannot reach the
terminal vertex up to time T . So f αe (θ) = 0 for θ > T − τe. Using
these two properties in (A.1) implies the second claim.For the last claim, observe that for any vertex v ∈ V \ {s, t}:
0 = excessf (v, t)
(5)=

e∈δ−(v)
t
θ=0
f ωe (θ)−

e∈δ+(v)
t
θ=0
f αe (θ)
(A.1)≤

e∈δ−(v)
t
θ=0
f ωe (θ)−

e∈δ+(v)
t+τe
θ=0
f ωe (θ). (∗)
So, for all 0 ≤ t ≤ T this implies that
0 = excessf (v, T )
(5)=

e∈δ−(v)
T
θ=0
f ωe (θ)−

e∈δ+(v)
T
θ=0
f αe (θ)
(A.2)=

e∈δ−(v)
T
θ=0
f ωe (θ)−

e∈δ+(v)
T
θ=0
f ωe (θ)
=

e∈δ−(v)
t−1
θ=0
f ωe (θ)−

e∈δ+(v)
t+τe−1
θ=0
f ωe (θ)  
≥0 by (∗)
+

e∈δ−(v)
T
θ=t
f ωe (θ)−

e∈δ+(v)
T
θ=t+τe
f ωe (θ)
≥

e∈δ−(v)
T
θ=t
f ωe (θ)−

e∈δ+(v)
T
θ=t+τe
f ωe (θ).
This settles the claim. 
With the lemma from above we show that the capacity of any
dynamic cut is an upper bound for the flow value of any flow in the
dynamic queuing model as stated in Theorem 7.
Theorem 13. For any dynamic flow f in the deterministic queuing
model and any dynamic cut X (both with time horizon T) we have:
val(f ) ≤ U(X).
Proof. First, note that
e∈δ+(t)
T
θ=ξt+τe
f ωe (θ)−

e∈δ−(t)
T
θ=ξt
f ωe (θ) = 0, (A.5)
since ξt = T + 1 and hence there are in fact no summands left.
For any dynamic flow f in the deterministic queuing model and
any cut X with times ξv for v ∈ V , where ξs = 0, we have:
0 ≤ val(f ) = −excessf (s, T )
=

e∈δ+(s)
T
θ=0
f ωe (θ)−

e∈δ−(s)
T
θ=0
f ωe (θ).
We use f ωe (θ) = 0 for e ∈ δ+(s) and θ < τe, add Eq. (A.3) for all
v ∈ V \ {s, t} together with the equation from above for vertex t:
≤

v∈V
 
e∈δ+(v)
T
θ=ξv+τe
f ωe (θ)−

e∈δ−(v)
T
θ=ξv
f ωe (θ)

≤

e∈E
e=(u,v)
T
θ=ξu+τe
f ωe (θ)−

e∈E
e=(u,v)
T
θ=ξv
f ωe (θ)
≤

e∈E
e=(u,v)
ξv−1
θ=ξu+τe
f ωe (θ)
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
e∈E
e=(u,v)
max {ξv − ξu − τe, 0} ue = U(X). 
The next goal is to show that a temporally repeated flow in the
flow over timemodel can be converted to a flow in the deterministic
queuing model with the same flow value. A general version of the
algorithm can be seen in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm1: Flow computation. More details for * in Remark 1.
Input: Graph G = (V , E), flow rates fˆp and path length τP of
paths P ∈ P in a temporally repeated flow and time
horizon T .
Output: Flow in deterministic queuing model.
1 For e = (v,w) ∈ E set Te = ∅ and add
entry

T + 1− τP(v,t); (0P)P∈Pe

to Te
and for e ∈ δ+(s) add 0; (0P)P∈Pe to Te;
2 for edge e = (v,w) ∈ E (sorted *1) do
3 Set the active pathsP ′e := Pe;
4 if v = s then for all P ∈ P ′e set the amount in the
bufferWP = FP else for all P ∈ P ′e setWP = 0while
P ′e ≠ ∅ do
5 Remove the entry

tα; (XP)P∈Pe

from Te, where tα is
the smallest time in Te. Let tω be the second smallest
time in Te and θ = tω − tα be the length of the current
time interval.
6 For P ∈ P ′e let fP = min

fˆP , XP +WP

be the flow
value of path P ∈ P ′e that can be utilized at edge e
and u = min

ue,

P∈P′e(XP +WP)

be the capacity
of edge e that can be utilized;
7 if θ >θ , whereθ is the maximum time span the flow
value fP and the capacity u can be utilized (*2) then
add

tα + θ˜; (XP)P∈Pe

to Te and set θ :=θ find
(YP)P∈P′e with fP ≤ YP ≤ XP +

WP
θ

, YP ∈ N for all
P ∈ P ′e and

P∈P′e YP = u;
8 for all P ∈ P ′e add

tα + τe; (YP)P∈P′e

to TeP ,
where eP is the subsequent edge after e in P;
9 for P ∈ P ′e do
10 if FP units of flow have been allocated to path P at
edge e then remove path P fromP ′e and
add (tω + τe; 0P) to the list Tep
11 for all P ∈ P ′e the remaining units of flow available for
path P , i.e., θ XP +WP − YP , are stored as the new
bufferWP and are available for allocation in the
upcoming iteration;
Some explanations for the algorithm are given in the following
remark:
Remark 1. • Te: The algorithm computes inflow rates XP for all
paths P ∈ Pe for every edge e. For better reading, rates from
previous iterations are denoted by X , rates that are currently
computed and stored for later iterations are denoted by Y . For
all times t where one of the entries from (XP)P∈Pe changes or
a path becomes inactive at ewe store an entry (t; (XP)P∈Pe) in
a list Te sorted by the time in an increasing order. So, starting at
time t all paths P ∈ Pe have flow values XP that state howmany
units of flow are available to be sent along edge e per time unit
until the next time in the list Te. For simplification of notation
we define the following: if for time t flow values for some paths
P ∈ Pe are missing, i.e., we have an entry (t, (XP)P∈P′) forsome strict subset P ′ ⊂ Pe, then they are set to the previous
flow value for P in Te, i.e., the flow value for P for the maximum
time t ′ ≤ t for which there is a flow value for path P or to
0 if there is no such value. So we can assume that all entries
we remove of Te have the form (t, (XP)P∈Pe), even if we only
added (t, (XP)P∈P′) for some subset P ′ ⊆ Pe to Te before.
During the algorithm we add entries (t, YP) to Te. This is done
under the constraint that an entry with the same flow value has
not been added before. That means we only add the entry, if
the flow value for P for the maximum time t ′ ≤ t for which
there is a flow value for path P differs from the current value
YP . Furthermore, the list never contains a time twice.
Note that flow starting at time T + 1 − τP(v,t) added to Te for
e = (v,w) ∈ E in Step 1 cannot reach the terminal vertex t
up to the time horizon T . We show in Lemma 15 that the total
amount of flow entering an edge e in path P in the temporally
repeated flow up to time t is also allocated to P at e up to time
t . Hence, there is no unit of flow available for allocation at edge
e at time T + 1− τP(v,t) .
• *1 in Step 2: The graph G′ = (V , E ′) that consists of the edges
from the paths P of the path decomposition of a maximum
temporally repeated flow fˆ is acyclic. This follows from the fact
that the maximum temporally repeated flow is obtained via a
flow decomposition of a minimum cost flow (see e.g., [34]).
Since we assumed that all travel times are strictly positive, a
cycle in the decomposition would contradict the optimality of
the minimum cost flow. Thus, we can assume that the vertices
in G′ are numbered according to a topological sorting, and that
in Step 2 the edges are considered in the order of the topological
sorting of their starting vertices.
• *2 in Step 7: Themaximumtime spanθP the flowvalue fP of path
P can be utilized can be computed as follows: if the amount of
flow available per time XP is at least as high as the flow value fP ,
i.e., XP ≥ fP , then this value can be utilized for the whole time
interval, i.e., θP = θ . Otherwise, XP < fP . Then the length of
the time interval is decreased to some value θP . The minimum
amount of flow (fP θP ) allocated during the interval (of length
θP ) cannot exceed the amount of flow available (WP + θP XP )
during that interval. This yields θP =

WP
fP−XP

in that case.
Furthermore, we know by step 6 that fP ≤ XP + WP . With
XP < fP we getθP = WPfP−XP ≥ 1.
• Themaximum time spanθe the capacity u can be utilized can be
computed as follows: if the amount of flow available per time
Xe = P∈P′e XP is at least as high as the capacity u, i.e., Xe ≥
u, then this value can be utilized for the whole time interval,
i.e., θe = θ . Otherwise, Xe < u. Then the length of the time
interval is decreased to some value θe. The minimum amount
of flow (u θe) allocated during the interval (of length θe) cannot
exceed the amount of flow (

P∈P′e(WP + θe XP)) available
during that interval. This yields θe =

P∈P′e WP
u−Xe

in that case.
Furthermore, we know by step 6 that u ≤ P∈P′e(XP + WP).
Soθe ≥ 1.
Thenθ = min θe, θP | P ∈ P ′e.• For the last edge e in a path P there is no subsequent edge eP .
So, the amount is stored for the terminal vertex t instead.
Lemma 14. The integer program in Step 7 of the algorithm has a
solution, which can be computed in time O(m).
Proof. For the ease of notation wewrite bP = XP +

WP
θ

. First we
show that the program is feasible, i.e.,

P∈P′e fP ≤ u ≤

P∈P′e bP .
The second inequality follows directly from the definition of u ≤
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P∈P′e bP . To see the first inequality we distinguish between two
cases. Let u = ue. By definition we have fP ≤ fˆP . A temporally
repeated flow meets the capacity constraints of the network,
i.e.,

P∈Pe fˆP ≤ ue. So, we get

P∈Pe fP ≤ ue = u. Now, let u =
P∈P′e bP . To see the first inequality we partitionP
′
e = P1 ∪P2
s.t. fP = fˆP ≤ bP for P ∈ P1 and fP = bP for P ∈ P2. Then
P∈P′e fP =

P∈P1 fˆP +

P∈P2 bP ≤

P∈P′e bP = u.
The integer program is feasible and can be written in the
following form:

P∈P′e YP = u, fP ≤ YP ≤ bP for all P ∈ P ′e, YP ∈
N, where all data is integral. It is easy to see that the corresponding
matrix is totally unimodular (see e.g., [35]). Hence, a solution can
be computed efficiently. Furthermore, a solution can also be given
explicitly by assigning the minimum value to the all paths and
distributing the remaining amount of flow arbitrarily among the
paths without violating the upper bounds. In fact, this can be done
in linear time O(m). 
The following lemma states that the algorithm transforms a
maximum temporally repeated flow to a flow in the deterministic
queuing model which sends the same amount of flow within the
same time horizon.
Lemma 15. The dynamic flow in the deterministic queuing model
with time horizon T constructed by Algorithm 1 has the same flow
value as the maximum temporally repeated flow with time horizon T
used as input for the algorithm.
Proof. First we show that the algorithm is well-defined in the
sense that every step can be carried out. We show some properties
by induction on the number of edges in a path P considered so
far in the for-loop of Step 2. To that end letTe = t1, . . . , tµ be
the set of all times added to the list Te for edge e = (v,w) during
the algorithm with ti < ti+1 for i ∈ {1, . . . , µ− 1}. We show by
induction on t with t + 1 ∈Te the following statements:
(1) The algorithm allocates at least dP,e,t = fˆP · min{t + 1 −
τP(s,v) , T+1−τP} units of flow to path P at edge e = (v,w) ∈ P
up to time t , which is the amount the temporally repeated
flow f T with time horizon T routes along path P at edge e. In
particular, it allocates FP = fˆP(T + 1− τP) units of flow to P at
edge e up to time T − τP(v,t) .
(2) At a start of thewhile-loop, the list Te in Step 6 of the algorithm
consists of at least one time tα < T + 1− τP(v,t) where the flow
rate XP or the amount of flow in the buffer WP is greater than
zero. Furthermore, it consists of time (T + 1− τP(v,t) ).
(3) The lower bound computed in Step 6 fulfils fP > 0 and the
solution of the integer program in Step 7 fulfils YP > 0.
(4) τP(s,v) is the smallest time inTe and there is some amount of
flow available for allocation at that time, i.e., XP +WP > 0 for
these variables at that time.
Induction start (for the edges): We start with the first edge e =
(s, u) of path P . ThenTe includes times τP(s,s) = 0 and T+1−τP > 0.
Since there is never a smaller time added to Te, 0 is the smallest
time inTe. The induction on the time starts with the first time t
with t + 1 ∈Te, i.e., t = t1 − 1 = −1. At that time no flow is sent
in both models and hence there is also no iteration and nothing to
show. At the start of the iteration for edge e = (s, u) (at time t1)
the buffer WP is set to the total amount of flow FP that has to be
allocated to P at e. The amount in the buffer is reduced in Step 11
by the amount allocated to path P .
For the induction step (for the time) at the first edges consider
some time t = ti+1 − 1 with ti+1 ∈ Te, i ∈ {1, . . . , µ− 1} and
the iteration from time ti up to time t = ti+1 − 1. Let D ≥ 0 be
the amount of flow that has already been allocated to P at e up to
time ti − 1. If all FP units of flow have already been allocated to
path P up to time ti − 1, then we are done, since statement (1) issatisfied and nomore iteration of the while-loop is executed in the
algorithm. Otherwise, the if-condition in Step 10 was not satisfied
in the previous iteration that ended at time ti − 1. So, we consider
time ti in Te at the start of the while-loop. The amount of flow in
the buffer at that time is positive, i.e.,WP > 0. Since t = ti+1 − 1,
there is also time T + 1− τP = tµ ≥ ti+1 = t + 1 > t in the set Te,
which shows (2). We have to show that at least dP,e,ti+1−1 = fˆP ti+1
units of flow are allocated to P at e up to time ti+1−1. By induction
hypothesis on t we know that D ≥ dP,e,ti−1 = fˆP ti units of flow
have already been allocated to P at e up to time ti − 1. IfWP ≥ fˆP ,
then also YP ≥ fP = fˆP > 0 (showing (3)) and hence, at least fP
units of flow are allocated to P at e per time. So, in total at least
dP,e,ti−1 + fˆP(ti+1 − 1+ 1− ti) = fˆP ti+1 = dP,e,ti+1−1 units of flow
are allocated to P at e up to time ti+1−1. OtherwiseWP < fˆP . Then
D > FP − fˆP and less than fˆP units of flow remain to be allocated.
Then YP = fP = WP > 0 (showing (3)) and hence, at least WP
units of flow are allocated to P at e per time. So, in total at least
FP ≥ dP,e,ti+1−1 units of flow are allocated to P at e up to time
ti+1 − 1. In particular, FP units of flow are allocated to P at e up
to time T + 1− τP and hence, no larger time is added toTe.
Induction step (for the edges): Consider path P at some edge
e = (v,w) ∈ E \ δ+(s). By induction hypothesis on e, for the
previous edge e′ = (u, v) in P before e we have t ′1 = τP(s,u) as the
smallest and t ′
µ′ = T+1−τP(u,t) as the largest time in the setTe′ by
(4). Furthermore, the first YP > 0 units of flow are made available
for allocation for P at e at time τP(s,v) . Hence, for the induction start
at a time smaller than τP(s,v) there is nothing to show.
For the induction step (for the time) at the edge e consider some
point in time t = ti+1 − 1 with ti+1 ∈ Te, i ∈ {1, . . . , µ− 1} and
the iteration from time ti up to time t = ti+1 − 1. Let D ≥ 0
be the amount of flow that has already been allocated to P at e
up to time ti − 1 and consider time ti in Te at the start of the
while-loop. If all FP units of flow have already been allocated to
path P up to time ti − 1, then we are done, since statement (1) is
satisfied and nomore iteration of the while-loop is executed in the
algorithm. Otherwise, the if-condition in Step 10 was not satisfied
in the previous iteration that ended at time ti − 1 (or the current
iteration is the first one).
If the flow rate satisfies XP > 0 during the iteration starting at
time ti, then Te includes time ti with XP > 0 as claimed. Otherwise
XP = 0. Then, the last iteration for path P at the previous edge
e′ ended before time ti − τe′ , since otherwise Y ′P > 0 units of flow
would have beenmade available for time ti in that iteration (by (3)).
So, by induction hypothesis, FP units of flow have been allocated to
P at e up to time ti−1−τe′ . Hence, they are available for allocation
at e up to time ti−1. Since they have not been allocated to P at e so
far, the remaining amount is stored in the buffer, i.e., WP > 0. So,
we always have XP +WP > 0 at the start of the while-loop. With
fˆP > 0 this implies that fP > 0. Since the integer program always
has a feasible solution we have YP ≥ fP > 0. This shows (3).
By induction hypothesis on the time t we know that D ≥
dP,e,ti−1 units of flow have already been allocated to P at e up to
time ti − 1. By induction hypothesis on e we know that at least
dP,e′,t−τe′ = dP,e,t units of flow have been allocated to the previous
edge e′ in P before e up to time t − τe′ and hence are available for
allocation to P at e up to time t . If D ≥ dP,e,t , then we are done.
Otherwise,D < dP,e,t . Butweknowby the argumentation above
that the amount of flow available for allocation to P at e up to time t
is at least dP,e,t . Hence, at least themissing dP,e,t−Dunits of floware
available for allocation up to time t , i.e., in the algorithm we have
θ XP+WP ≥ dP,e,t−Dwith θ = ti+1−ti = t+1−ti. If XP+WP ≥ fˆP ,
we are also done, because then at least fP = fˆP units of flow are
allocated by the algorithm per time between ti and t , i.e., in total at
36 T.L. Werth et al. / Operations Research Perspectives 1 (2014) 18–41Fig. A.10. Example for the calculation of amaximum flow. Graphwith edge names,
travel times and capacities on the top left, path decomposition from the flow
over time model (with length and capacity) on the bottom left and functioning
of Algorithm 1 on the right. The numbers near the paths give the numbers of
users. At each vertex v and every point in time the flow rates change an entry
(t : YP1 , YP2 , YP3 ) is drawn. It states the time t the flow reaches the vertex (and
the outgoing edges) and the amount YPj allocated to the corresponding path Pj at the
ingoing edge per timeunit until the next time entry for all j ∈ {1, 2, 3}, which is then
available for allocation at the outgoing edge. (For interpretation of the references to
colour in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
least dP,e,ti−1+ fˆP θ = fˆP(ti−τP(s,v)+θ) = fˆP(t+1−τP(s,v)) = dP,e,t
units of flow up to time t .
Else, we have fP = XP + WP < fˆP . Then all units of flow that
have been made available for P at e up to time ti (at least dP,e,ti
units of flow), except for those fP units above, have already been
allocated to P . If ti = t , then D + XP + WP is exactly the amount
of flow available for allocation for P at e up to time t . We already
know that (by induction hypothesis on e) it is at least dP,e,t . Since
it is allocated in the current iteration we are done.
Otherwise, we have ti < t , i.e., ti < t < ti+1. Since there is
no time in the list Te in between and YP ≥ fP = XP + WP , the
buffer is empty at time ti + 1 ≤ t . Since the inflow rate XP does
not change (otherwise there would be another time inTe) we have
WP = 0 at time ti. Hence, fP = XP and WP = 0 during the whole
interval. So,D+(t+1−ti) XP is exactly the amount of flowavailable
for allocation for P at e up to time t . We already know that (by
induction hypothesis on e) it is at least dP,e,t and no unit of flow
is stored in the buffer. Hence, dP,e,t units of flow are allocated to
path P at edge e up to time t by the algorithm. 
Next we give an example of the algorithm.
Example 5. Consider the instance from Fig. A.10 for themaximum
s–t-flow problem with time horizon T = 17 in the deterministic
queuing model.
In the flow over time model, a maximum temporally repeated
flow routes for exactly T + 1 − τP1 = 11 time units fˆP1 = 4 units
of flow along path P1 = (s, v1, v3, t) (solid (red)), i.e., in total
FP1 = 11 · 4 = 44 units, for T + 1 − τP2 = 10 time units fˆP2 = 5
units of flow along path P2 = (s, v2, v3, t) (dashed (blue)), i.e., in
total FP2 = 10 ·5 = 50 units, and for exactly T +1−τP3 = 11 time
units fˆP3 = 3 units of flow along path P3 = (s, v2, t) (dash-dotted
(green)), i.e., in total FP3 = 11 · 3 = 33 units, which gives a flow
with flow value of val(f T+1) = 127.
The algorithm works as stated in the following table. It states
the following information: the active path denoted by P j for some
j, the amount of flow XP j available per time unit during the current
interval, the lower bound fP for the flow value of path P j and the for
the capacity u of the edge computed by the algorithm, the initial
length θ and the real lengthθ of the current time interval. If thelength of the interval is reduced, a newpoint in time is added to the
current list Tei . There is an entry YP j for the solution of the integer
program, the subsequent edge eP in P after e and the entry added
to the list TePj of that edge. The last entries state the amount of flow
WP j in the buffer at the end of the iteration and the amount of flowFP j that still has to be allocated to P at e.
The algorithm iterates over all edges (every iteration is a block
in the table). The first line of every block states the current edge ei
and the starting conditions for the current iteration. For the source
the paths P j traversing the edge have some flow in the butterWP j at
the beginning, otherwise the buffer is empty. Then the important
data for every iteration over the time is stated explicitly in the
middle lines of each block. If there is more than one active path,
then for one time there are multiple lines, one for each path. The
most important column is the 10th (add to TePj ), where Step 8 of
the algorithm adds new times and flow values to the list of the
upcoming edge eP j of path P
j. In the last line of each block the
iteration ends becauseFP j = 0 and additional times at which no
more flow is sent are added to the list. See Table A.1.
Some entries in the table for the list TePj seem to be missing.
That is because the algorithm only adds entries in step 8 if they
differ from the previous entry in the list. Since the flow rates do
not change, no new time step is necessary.
The result is shown in Fig. A.10 on the right. Note that list Te for
edge e is drawn near the start vertex of e for space reasons. So there
are entries fromdifferent edges in the list of one vertex (e.g., vertex
v2). All flow units arrive at vertex t up to time 17. By the previous
lemma this is an upper bound for the flow value in the determin-
istic queuing model. So the flow value is maximum. ▹
With the lemma above we get the following result:
Theorem 16. Let f T be a maximum temporally repeated flow with
time horizon T . ThenAlgorithm1 transformed f T into amaximum flow
in the deterministic queuing model in polynomial time.
Proof. Since Lemma 15 holds for the terminal vertex t , the flow
value of the flow constructed by the algorithm (which gives the
distribution of the flow to the edges for every vertex) is exactly
the same as the flow value of the temporally repeated flow which
was used as an input. Hence, starting with a maximum temporally
repeated flowwill give a flowwith flow value equal to the capacity
of a dynamic cut. Since this is an upper bound for the flow value in
the deterministic queuing model, the resulting flow is maximum
in this model.
In total we have to consider every vertex v twice for every
path traversing it (when it becomes active and inactive again).
Since there are at most m paths in the path decomposition for
the temporally repeated flow in total we have at most O(mn)
operations on the lists Te for e ∈ E. If we store every list by means
of a balanced data structure we can insert and remove entries in
O(log n) time. This yields a total complexity of O(mn log n). 
Appendix B. Negative results in the sum-case
Here we summarize the negative results for the sum objective
mentioned in the paper.
B.1. Example without a Nash equilibrium
First we give an example of a game with sum-objective, which
has noNash equilibrium. Note that this is only a slightmodification
from Example 2, which had no Nash equilibrium in the game with
bottleneck objective.
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Data for Example 5, for more details see text.
tα P j XP j fP j u θ θ add to Tei YP j eP j add to TePj WP j FP j
Edge e1 , paths P j, j ∈ {1}, bufferWP1 = 44, flowFP1 = 44
0 P1 0 4 5 11 8 (8, 0P1 ) 5 e4 (2, 5P1 ) 4 4
8 P1 0 4 4 3 1 (9, 0P1 ) 4 e4 (10, 4P1 ) 0 0
End of iteration; add (11, 0P1 ) to Te4
Edge e2 , paths P j, j ∈ {2, 3}, bufferWP2 = 50,WP3 = 33, flowFP2 = 50,FP3 = 33
0 P2 0 5 18 10 4 (4, 0P2 , 0P3 ) 10 e6 (3, 10P2 ) 10 10
P3 0 3 8 e5 (3, 8P3 ) 1 1
4 P2 0 5 11 6 1 (5, 0P2 , 0P3 ) 10 e6 (7, 10P2 ) 0 0
P3 0 1 1 e5 (7, 1P3 ) 0 0
End of iteration; add (8, 0P2 ) to Te6 and (8, 0P3 ) to Te5
Edge e4 , paths P j, j ∈ {1}, bufferWP1 = 0, flowFP1 = 44
2 P1 5 4 4 8 8 4 e7 (6, 4P1 ) 8 12
10 P1 4 4 4 1 1 4 e7 8 8
11 P1 0 4 4 2 2 4 e7 0 0
End of iteration; add (17, 0P1 ) to Te7
Edge e5 , paths P j, j ∈ {3}, bufferWP3 = 0, flowFP3 = 33
3 P3 8 3 8 4 4 8 e7 (6, 8P3 ) 0 1
7 P3 1 1 1 1 1 1 e7 (10, 1P3 ) 0 0
End of iteration; add (11, 0P3 ) to Te7
Edge e6 , paths P j, j ∈ {2}, bufferWP2 = 0, flowFP2 = 50
3 P2 10 5 5 5 5 5 t (8, 5P2 ) 25 25
8 P2 0 5 5 5 5 5 t (13, 5P2 ) 0 0
End of iteration; add (14, 0P2 ) to Tt
Edge e7 , paths P j, j ∈ {1, 3}, bufferWP1 = WP3 = 0, flowFP1 = 44,FP3 = 33
6 P1 4 4 7 4 4 4 t (7, 10P2 ) 0 28
P3 8 3 3 t (7, 8P3 ) 20 21
10 P1 4 4 7 1 1 4 0 24
P3 1 3 3 18 18
11 P1 4 4 7 6 6 4 0 0
P3 0 0 3 0 0
End of iteration; add (18, 0P1 , 0P3 ) to TtExample 6. Consider the graph G = (V , E) from Fig. B.11 with
k = 6 weighted users and the travel times and capacities as given
in the figure near the edges as an instance of a dynamic routing
game with sum objective. Commodities are denoted by (si, ti) for
user i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6} with priority i, where the first two users
are the main users, while the other four users are auxiliary users.
Note that the auxiliary users from commodity 3 to 6 do not have
a choice on which route to take. Their purpose is to slow down
the other users. So they are called blocking users. The users from
commodities 1 and2have twopath choices each, because the outer
paths have a capacity smaller than their weight. Then there are
four strategy profiles left which are drawn as graphs in the right
of Fig. B.11.
Whenever both of the main users choose their left paths (upper
left strategy profile), then the lower user arrives at vertex v4 (filled)
at the same time as the left blocking user from commodity 3. Since
the blocking users has an inferior priority, the blocking user is
slowed down by one time unit. This is enough to reach vertex v1
of the upper main user’s path at the same time (4) as the blocking
user from commodity 5 does. Since the edge (v1, v2) has capacity
2 and the total load entering the edge at time 4 is given by 3, one
of the users arrives at vertex v2 at time 5 and the other one at time
6. The main user from commodity 1 arrives at vertex v1 at time 5,
i.e., one time unit after the other two users. Hence, these users are
allowed to leave edge (v1, v2) before her. Since user 1 has weight 2
equal to the capacity of the edge, she arrives at vertex v2 one time
step after the two blocking users left the edge, i.e., at time 7. So, she
arrives at vertex v at time 8 and at the terminal at time 9, while the
main user from commodity 2 reaches both vertices one unit in time
earlier.Hence, the user from commodity 1 changes to the upper right
path (upper right strategy profile). Here, the blocking users arrive
at vertex v5 at the times 3 and 4 and at vertex v6 at times 4
and 5, while the main user arrives at vertex v5 at time 5 and
at vertex v6 at time 6 without being affected by the blocking
users. So, both main users arrive at vertex v at time 7. Since the
user from commodity 1 has a higher priority, she arrives at the
terminal t1,2 at time 8, one time unit earlier than in her old path.
So, this change is an improvement for her, while the travel time
of the main user from commodity 2 is increased by one time unit.
Hence, this user is unsatisfied with her path and changes to the
lower right path (lower right strategy profile), which results in the
same case as when both users took the left paths. Continuing with
this behaviour shows that there is no Nash equilibrium for this
instance.
The analysis above also shows that there is always a path of
length 8 for both of the main users and there is never a path with
smaller travel time. Hence, we can assume that there is always
a path for the user 1 with travel time 8 and never a path with a
smaller travel time. If we remove the user from commodity 1, then
every path of user 2 has theminimum travel time and, hence, gives
a Nash equilibrium.We need these statements later in the proof of
Theorem 19. ▹
B.2. Hardness of Quickest Flow
Here we show that the Quickest Flow problem is hard to solve
with a reduction similar to the one in the proof of Theorem 1 in the
bottleneck case.
38 T.L. Werth et al. / Operations Research Perspectives 1 (2014) 18–41Fig. B.11. Left: instance with multi commodities which does not possess a Nash equilibrium. The first number near an edge denotes its travel time and the second one
its capacity. The boxed expressions are the users and the index next to the box the priority of the user. Right: four relevant strategy profiles. Here, dashed (blue) lines are
used for the first commodity, dotted (green) lines for the second commodity and solid (red) lines for the other four; unused edges are slightly grey. The numbers near some
vertices show the arrival times of the users at these vertices. The inner numbers correspond to the main users, the outer ones to the auxiliary users. The filled vertices show
situations where users enter an edge at the same time.Fig. B.12. Illustration of the reduction from 3-SAT to the Quickest Flow problem in the two commodity case. Left: the graph shows a gadget representing a literal
xi, i ∈ {0, . . . , η − 1}. The expressions near some of the edges are the travel times of these edges. The expressions near some of the vertices denote the expected arrival
times at these vertices, if there is a feasible truth assignment. All capacities are set to 1. Right: shows the whole graph. The greyly shaded areas illustrate the gadgets.Theorem 17. The Quickest Flow problem is NP-complete in the
strong sense in the two commodity case, even if all users are
unweighted.
Proof. Weuse the same reduction from3-SAT as for the bottleneck
case. The instance of 3-SAT is given by a set of Boolean variables
X = x0, . . . , xη−1, and ρ clauses (Cj)j=1,...,ρ containing exactly
three literals.
We construct an instance of Quickest Flow as we did for
NarrowestFlow in Theorem 1. While the definitions are not
repeated here, the illustration can be seen in the right part of
Fig. B.12, which is nearly the same as in the bottleneck case. One
difference is, that the edges with travel times greater than one do
not have to be replaced by consecutive edgeswith travel time equal
to one here. Furthermore, we do not need local priorities for the
edges for the makespan objective.
Note that in a flow with makespan ≤ T , the edges connecting
the gadgets can only be used by the first user. Hence, any user from
the second commodity can only traverse a single gadget. Since
every clause is connected to the second terminal vertex t2 by a
single edge and a total amount of ρ users have to be routed for
the second commodity, a flow with makespan ≤ T has to route a
single unit of flow along each clause vertex. Furthermore, no userin this flow can be slowed down by another user, since every path
has capacity 1, free travel time T and all users traversing a subpath
of the path arrive at the common vertices at the same time.
With these observations it is easy to show that there is a flow
with makespan≤ T iff there is a feasible truth assignment.
Let f be a feasible flow with makespan T . Then, a single unit of
flow routes from s1 to t1 without meeting another user. We set the
variable xi to true if this unit routes in the ith gadget along the lower
path and we set the variable xj to false if it routes in the jth gadget
along the upper path. Then the users from the second commodity
route along the vertices from the upper path in gadget i and along
vertices from the lower path in gadget j. From these vertices one
unit of flow is routed to each of the clause vertices and afterwards
to the sink. Since at least one vertex in the path of a gadget of the
corresponding variable is connected to a clause it is contained in.
In any clause there is one vertex that is set to true by the flow. So,
the flow induces a truth assignment.
On the other hand, given a truth assignment, we route the user
from the first commodity in the ith gadget along the lower path,
if the variable xi, i ∈ I , in the truth assignment is true and we
route the user in the jth gadget along the upper path, if the variable
xj, j ∈ J , is false. At least one vertex in this path inside a gadget of
the corresponding variable is connected to a clause the variable is
T.L. Werth et al. / Operations Research Perspectives 1 (2014) 18–41 39contained in. In any clause there is one variable that is set to true.
So, for the second commodity we route one unit of flow along a
shortest path along a vertex in the upper path of each gadget i ∈ I
or one unit along a shortest path along a vertex in the lower path
of each gadget j ∈ J towards each clause vertex to which no unit of
flow from the second commodity was already routed to. This gives
a feasible flow and no two units of flow use the same edge. Hence,
the makespan of this flow is given by T . 
The following lemma only states technical facts from the previ-
ous proof that are needed to prove Theorem 19.
Lemma 18. For the instance built in the proof of Theorem 17 the
following statements hold true:
• There is a flow for all k users (one user for commodity 1 and the
remaining users for commodity 2) with makespan value equal
to T iff there is a feasible truth assignment for the underlying
3-SAT problem. Otherwise, the makespan value is at least T + 1.
• If we allocate the worst priority to the user from the first
commodity and the makespan of the flow is larger than T , then the
travel time of the user from the first commodity is at least T + 1.
• All paths have travel time at least T , even if the number of users is
changed.
• If the single user from commodity1 is removed, then there is always
a flow with travel time T , which can be computed easily.
Proof. Results (1) and (3) follow directly from the proof above.
For the second statement we only have to note that if there is
no feasible truth assignment, then the path of the user from the
first commodity always intersects with the path of a user from the
second commodity at the same time. Since the user from the first
commodity has the lower priority, her travel time is increased by
one and, hence, it is at least T + 1.
For the last statement consider the instance built in the proof of
Theorem 17 with only the users from commodity 2. Then no edge
is blocked by the user from commodity 1 any more. The only goal
is to send one user of commodity 2 to each of the ρ clause vertices.
Since every clause contains one of the literals in the gadgets we
just pick one out of each. Since there is a path from source s2 to
each of these literals, we just route one user to this literal, then to
the corresponding clause vertex and from there to the terminal t2.
This gives a flow for the k−1 users of commodity 2withmakespan
value T , which is computed efficiently. 
B.3. Hardness of NashExistence
Here we show that the question whether a Nash equilibrium
exists or not is hard to answer with a reduction similar to the one
in the bottleneck case in the proof of Theorem 5.
Theorem 19 (NashExistence isNP-hard). TheNashExistenceprob-
lem is NP-hard in the strong sense in the multi-commodity case, even
if the graph is acyclic.
Proof. Now the hardness is shown with a reduction similar to
the one for the bottleneck case. Nevertheless we state the full
construction here, because some travel times and capacities differ.
An instance of 3-SAT is given by a set of Boolean variables X =
x0, . . . , xη−1

, and ρ clauses (Cj)j=1,...,ρ containing exactly three
literals. The idea behind the subsequent construction follows from
two former results:
We already know by Lemma 18 that the graph GD constructed
in the proof of Theorem 17, with one user routing for the first
commodity, can be traversedwith a travel time of T iff the instance
of 3-SAT has a feasible truth assignment. Otherwise, the travel time
is at least T + 1. On the other hand, without this user from the first
commodity, the remaining k − 1 users can always route throughthe graph with makespan value T (independently on the instance
of the 3-SAT problem).
Furthermore, we have seen in Example 6 an instance with a
graph GN , which has no Nash equilibrium if there is a single user
routing for its first commodity. Additionally, there is always a path
with travel time T for this user and never a pathwith smaller travel
time. Without this user every feasible strategy profile of the other
users gives a Nash equilibrium.
We add both graphs in one supergraph. First we add a super
source s and connect it to the source s1 of the first commodity in
both graphs via an edgewith travel time 1.We add a super terminal
t and connect the terminal of the first commodity in GN to this
terminal via an edgewith travel time 1. The capacities of all of these
edges are set to 2. Next, we have to make sure that the user from
the first commodity inGD always suffers (i.e., has amakespan value
of T+6) if the flow has amakespan value higher than T+5. To that
end we need to extend the instance a little bit, by adding vertices
s′3, s
′
4, t
′
2, u, w and t
′
1 and the following edges:
Edge (s′3, t2) (s
′
4, t2) (t2, t
′
2) (t
′
2, w) (t1, u) (u, w) (w, t
′
1) (t
′
1, t)
Travel
time
T T + 3 1 2 1 2 1 1
Capacity 1 2 2ρ 1 2 2 2 2
The former users from commodity 2 in GD now route from s2
to t ′2 and are called clause users. We add an additional blocking
user, who routes from s′3 to t
′
1 and one from s
′
4 to t
′
1. The users from
the first commodity in both graphs are merged to one user, who
routes from the new super source s to the new super terminal t
and is called the main user here. Note that she has weight 2. All
other users from graph GN have the same sources and terminals
as before. The priorities of the users are chosen in such a way
that the main user has highest priority, the user from the second
commodity in GN has second highest priority, the blocking users in
this subgraph have priorities 3 to 6, the clause users have priorities
7 to 6+η, and the two remaining blocking users from s′3 and s′4 have
priorities 7 + η and 8 + η, respectively. The actual values of the
priorities are chosen arbitrarily. The whole illustration is shown in
Fig. B.13.
Claim 1.We have seen in Example 6, that in the graph GN , there is
always a path for the user from commodity 1withmakespan value
8. Hence, there is always a path from s to t with makespan value
T + 9. But, then the user from the second commodity in this graph
is not satisfied with her path.
Claim 2. The user from commodity 1 never routes along t2, since
the capacity of edge (t ′2, w) is 1 and her weight is 2.
Claim 3. Iff the flow of the clause users in the subgraph GD has
makespan value ≥ T + 1, i.e., the main user arrives at vertex t1
after time T+1 or a user fromcommodity 2 arrives at vertex t2 after
time T , then the user from commodity 1 cannot reach the terminal
vertex t before time T + 10.
Proof. In the graph GD with the modifications made above, all
clause users arrive at vertex t2 at time T , if none of them is slowed
down before. At this time the user from s′3 also arrives at vertex t2.
Since she has a lower priority, she has to wait for one time unit.
Then she arrives at vertex w at time T + 4. The user from source
s′4 arrives at vertex w at time T + 3. The main user also traverses
vertex w when routing through GD. If she is not slowed down by
any other user, then she arrives at vertexw at time T+4. Since she
has the best priority, she traverses the subsequent edge first at this
point in time and arrives at the terminal t at time T + 9.
If themain user was slowed down inside the graph GD, then she
arrives at vertex t1 after time T + 1. Then she reaches the terminal
after time T + 9.
Otherwise, themain user is not slowed down insideGD and, if at
least one of the clause users arrives at least one time unit later than
40 T.L. Werth et al. / Operations Research Perspectives 1 (2014) 18–41Fig. B.13. Illustration of the reduction from 3-SAT to NashExistence. The first expression near an edge is its travel time, the second one its capacity. The upper graph is
from the reduction from 3-SAT to Quickest Flow used in the proof of Theorem 17, the left graph from Example 6. The exact travel times and capacities for the edges in these
subgraphs can be found in the corresponding sections.T at t2, then the user from s′3 arrives at vertexw at time T + 3. The
user from source s′4 also arrives at vertex w at time T + 3. If both
users arrive at the same time, then the user from source s′4 has to
wait for one time unit in the waiting queue. The main user arrives
at vertex w at time T + 4. Since she enters edge (w, t ′1) after the
other two users, she leaves the edge after them, i.e., not before time
T + 6. Then she enters the terminal not before time T + 10. ▹
Main Claim. There is a feasible truth assignment for the 3-SAT
instance iff there is Nash equilibrium in the enhanced instance.
Proof. Now assume that there is a feasible truth assignment for
the 3-SAT instance. By Theorem 17 we can route the user from
commodity 1 along a path from s to t1 with travel time T . The
clause users can also be routed with travel time T to the vertex
t2. Since they have a better priority than the blocking user from s′3,
they reach their terminal t ′2 at time T+1, which is best possible. By
Claim 3 themain user traverses the edge (w, t ′1)with travel time 1,
since the blocking user from source s′3 is slowed downby the clause
users. Hence, the main user arrives at her terminal t at time T + 9,
which is best possible. Without the user from the first commodity
routing through the graph GN , there is also a Nash equilibrium in
this graph. Hence, there is a Nash equilibrium for the enhanced
instance.
Assume conversely that there is no feasible truth assignment
for the 3-SAT instance. By Theorem 17 any flow with one user
routing for the first commodity in the graph GD has makespan
value≥ T + 1. By Claim 3 the main user receives makespan value
≥ T + 10 up to the terminal t , when routing through the subgraph
GD. Since there is always a path in GN with travel time T + 9 by
Claim 1, she changes her path to this graph. By Example 6, there
is no Nash equilibrium in this subgraph. Hence, there cannot be a
Nash equilibrium in the enhanced instance. 
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